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HOW THE NEW ECONOMICS CAN IMPROVE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW, AND HOW ECONOMICS CAN
SURVIVE THE DEMISE OF THE 'RATIONAL ACTOR"
ScoTT A. Moss* & PETER H. HUANG**
ABSTRACT
Much employment discrimination law is premised on a purely
money-focused "reasonable" employee, the sort who can be made
whole with damages equal to lost wages, and who does not hesitate
to challenge workplace discrimination. This type of "rational" actor
populated older economic models but has been since modified by
behavioral economics and research on happiness. Behavioral and
traditional economists alike have analyzed broad employment
policies, such as the wisdom of discrimination statutes, but the devil
is in the details of employment law. On the critical damages-and-
liability issues the Supreme Court and litigators face regularly, the
law essentially ignores the lessons of behavioral economics and the
affective sciences.
(1) Damages: With emotional distress and punitive
damages limited, the basic discrimination damages
are the employee's lost income. Courts draw no dis-
tinction between a failure to hire a job applicant and
a termination of a long-term employee, yet endow-
ment effect and happiness research indicate that
terminated long-term employees typically suffer
greater psychological loss, justifying greater dam-
ages.
(2) Employer Duties: Effective antidiscrimination pro-
grams can shield employers from liability, but the
cases and scholarship say little about what programs
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are effective. Research showing that people think and
problem solve best in positive emotional states
indicates that programs focused on negativity (for
example, "discrimination gets us sued") yield fear and
backlash but not the productive employee effort,
understanding, and empathy that lessen bias.
(3) Employee Duties: Harassment victims often cannot
sue unless they first complained to their employer.
Courts should recognize the reasonableness of not
complaining due to learned helplessness and because
the endowment effect and loss aversion explain
reluctance to upset even a bad status quo (a job with
harassment). The risk of loss (retaliation) outweighs
the possible gain (ending harassment).
This Article also analyzes broad implications of behavioral and
happiness research for law and economics:
(1) Do behavioral and happiness adjustments to a ra-
tional actor model make economics indeterminate?
Economics still can yield useful legal analyses, but
likely narrower ones (for example, improving indi-
vidual, micro-level determinations of damages and
reasonable behavior) than past economic analyses of
macro-level issues, like whether all discrimination
law is "efficient."
(2) Psychologically informed economics often prescribes
regulation of markets. It asks, 'When is such reg-
ulation worth the transaction costs and incentive
distortions?" More complex rules, like those this
Article prescribes, are worth the cost in higher-
stakes, less-repeated transactions like employment
than in lower-stakes, often-repeated transactions like
consumer purchases.
(3) Should courts rely on these new findings or instead
disclaim reliance on any social science because new
research often displaces prior findings? In employ-
ment cases, courts must assess make-whole damages
and employee reasonableness, so they cannot avoid
some conception of well-being and cognition-and
[Vol. 51:183184
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even imperfect new findings beat disproven, too-
narrow "rationality" assumptions.
This Article thus offers a half-full/half-empty assessment of the
usefulness of economics, and of behavioral and happiness research,
to law. It sounds a cautionary note against using social science to
assess grand legal policies, but a hopeful note that such research can
improve decision making by judges, firms, and individuals.
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If it makes you happy, then why the hell are you so sad?
- Sheryl Crow
The most beautiful things in the world are the most useless,
peacocks and lilies for instance.
- John Ruskin
INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination law is stuck in the law-and-econom-
ics stone ages-before economists began revising the "rational actor"
model with research findings in behavioral economics' and on
factors affecting subjective well-being ("happiness research"),2 and
before legal scholars started applying those behavioral3 and
happiness4 findings to law. Worse, in assuming a wholly money-
focused "reasonable" employee, many employment doctrines are far
narrower than even the earliest, most narrow rationality-based law-
and-economics scholarship.' Employment discrimination law thus
1. See generally ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer et ai. eds.,
2003); BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen
eds., 2007); JOHN MALCOLM DOWLING & YAP CHIN-FANG, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2007); NICK WILKINSON, AN INTRODUCTION To BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS (2008).
2. See generally MARK ANIEIsKI, THE ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS: BUILDING GENUINE
WEALTH (2007); BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS (2008); HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF HAPPINESS (Luigi Bruni & Pier Luigi Porta eds., 2007); RICHARD
LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005).
3. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Christine JoUs, Cass R.
Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect And Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1227 (2003).
4. See generally Peter H. Huang, Authentic Happiness, Self-Knowledge, & Legal Policy,
9 MNN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 755 (2008); Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence
Affect, Happiness, & Trust?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 257 (2008); Peter H. Huang & Rick Swedloff,
Authentic Happiness and Meaning at Law Firms, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 335 (2008); Nancy
Levit & Douglas 0. Linder, Happy Law Students, Happy Lawyers, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 351
(2008).
5. Even some 1970s economic analyses of law noted nonmonetary preferences. E.g., GARY
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 19-21 (1976) (noting nonpecuniary
costs and benefits in regulating discrimination, incorporating subjective values such as "tastes
for discrimination" into the "rational actor" model); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
is based upon economic conceptions of decision making and pref-
erences that are so narrow, they at best are out of date, and at worst
never really existed.
[Liabor market specialists and human resources economists are
coming to realize that traditional economics has been too
simplistic in its assumptions on human motivation .... [L]abor
market research must be rewritten.... [N]eoclassical economists
have maintained that the labor market is no different ... than
the market in goods .... [Yet] experiments and empirical investi-
gations on the effectiveness of incentives indicate ... individuals
do not exclusively think of themselves.6
There has been great debate among economists about whether and
to what extent there should be laws against employment discrimina-
tion,7 which, given the employment-at-will doctrine, is both the
main field of employment regulation and the source of doctrine for
other areas of employment law, like whistleblowing.8 Yet the devil
is in the details of employment discrimination law, and there has
been little contemporary economic or social science thinking about
those details.
(1) Damages: Whether lawsuits are filed depends heavily
on what damages are available, as shown by the
dramatic increase in Title VII litigation9 after Con-
OF LAW 545 (2d ed. 1977) (same as to pornography).
6. NORBERT HARING & OLAF STORBECK, ECONOMICS 2.0: WHAT THE BEST MINDS IN
ECONOMICS CAN TEACH You ABouT BUSINESS AND LIFE 10 (2009); see also DACHER KELTNER,
BORN To BE GOOD: THE SCIENCE OF A MEANINGFUL LIFE (2009) (offering broader theories of
human behavior).
7. Compare John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411 (1986)
(concluding that a ban on discrimination is efficient), with RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws (1992) (arguing the
contrary).
8. See generally Scott A. Moss, Where There's At- Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing
the Increasing Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295 (2005).
9. See Marcela Noemi Siderman, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth Saving:
Reforming Arbitration to Accommodate Title VIProtections, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1885, 1886-87
& n.1 (2000) (noting how, once the 1991 amendments to Title VII created a jury trial right and
increased remedies, "[b]ased on these increased protections for employees, employment
litigation has exploded," with employment discrimination lawsuits more than doubling in four
years (citations omitted)).
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gress increased available damages in 1991.10 What
monetary relief is needed to "make whole" (the Title
VII command)" a worker who lost a job due to dis-
crimination?
(2) Employer Duties: Even in egregious cases of discrimi-
nation or harassment, employers have affirmative
defenses, either to punitive damages 2 or to all
liability, 3 based on efforts to prevent and redress
discrimination. When should employers' antibias
efforts be sufficient to shield them from liability for
proven discrimination?
(3) Employee Duties: Employers may not be liable for
discriminatory or retaliatory harassment, 4 even by
supervisors. If an employer has an internal complaint
process, an employee must file a prompt internal
complaint to a supervisor or with the human re-
sources department before suing. 5 When, if ever,
should employees be excused from complaining
internally?
10. See Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1629
(2006) (noting that Title VII originally limited relief "to the equitable remedies of... back pay
and possible reinstatement," but since 1991 has also allowed compensatory and punitive
damages).
11. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) ("[I]n the punitive
damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory
employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the
employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.' (citation omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (holding that an employer
may raise an affirmative defense to a vicarious liability charge when the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent or correct discrimination and harassment, and the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of opportunities for correcting the problem); Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (same).
14. Harassment is just one form of discrimination in "terms and conditions" of
employment based on grounds such as sex, race, age, disability, or retaliation. See Richardson
v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436, 446 (2d Cir. 1999) (describing racial and
retaliatory harassment as possible sources of employer liability); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State
Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that retaliatory harassment byco-workers
may be a source of employer liability).
15. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08 (holding that an employee's failure to use a complaint
procedure provided by the employer establishes an affirmative defense for the employer);
Eflerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (same).
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The Supreme Court 6 and practicing lawyers17 regularly grapple
with these critical damages-and-liability issues, yet the law essen-
tially ignores the lessons of behavioral economics and cognitive
science.
(1) Damages: The basic discrimination damages are the
employee's lost income. Courts draw no distinction
between a failure to hire an applicant and the termi-
nation of a long-term employee, yet damages for the
latter should be higher. Behavioral economic findings
(on the endowment effect), and happiness research
findings (on the effects of unemployment) indicate
that a nonhired employee typically suffers less
psychological loss than a terminated long-term
employee.18
(2) Employer Duties: Antidiscrimination/harassment pro-
grams vary. Some are effective; others are ineffectual
or disingenuous. The cases and scholarship are not
well-developed as to what programs suffice. Findings
that people think and problem solve best in positive
emotional states indicate that programs focused on
negativity (for example, do not discriminate because
16. For Supreme Court cases on defenses to liability or damages based on
employer/employee antidiscrimination duties, see infra notes 222, 223, and 262 and
accompanying text (citing Faragher, Ellerth, and Kolstad, respectively). For cases on relief,
see, for example, Pollard v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001) (holding that
Title VII damages caps do not apply to awards of front pay for future economic loss); Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (requiring specific evidence of injury for an award of emotional
distress damages on civil rights claims); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)
(finding broad equitable powers to award relief, including retroactive seniority, to Title VII
plaintiffs); Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. 405 (holding that prevailing Title VII plaintiffs
should presumptively receive back pay, not just upon employer bad faith).
17. For example, the Practicing Law Institute's Annual Institute on Employment Law, a
prominent continuing legal education event, frequently covers these issues of employment
damages and affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Michael Delikat, Legal Issues In the Defense of
Sexual Harassment, 727 PLI/LIT 231 (2005); Michael Faillace, Training Your Employees and
Managers on Employment Discrimination: A Risk Prevention Strategy, 188 PLI/CRM 443
(2001); Willis Goldsmith, Employment Compliance Programs, Audits and Investigations, 746
PLIILIT 651 (2006); Debra Morway & Melissa C. Rodriguez, Damages Under Federal and New
York Employment Statutes, 782 PLIJLIT 119 (2008); Wayne Outten et al., Practice Pointers on
Opposing the Affirmative Defense that the Employer Took Reasonable Steps To Prevent Sexual
Harassment, 656 PLIILIT 187 (2001); Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr. & Gary Trachten, Damages in
Employment Law, 727 PLILIT 539 (2005).
18. See infra Part I.
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it causes lawsuits and disharmony) risk fear and
backlash but are unlikely to yield productive em-
ployee effort or the co-worker understanding and
empathy that lessen bias.'"
(3) Employee Duties: Only upon specific evidence of
retaliation do courts excuse harassed employees from
complaining internally. Yet research findings show
why harassed employees may not complain: (a)
endowment effects and loss aversion explain reluc-
tance to upset even a bad status quo (a job with
harassment), because the risk of loss (retaliation)
outweighs the prospect of gain (ending harassment);
(b) salience and availability biases heighten that fear;
and (c) learned helplessness can make harassment
victims unable to complain.2"
It is particularly surprising that behavioral economics has not
been applied to these employment law issues. Behavioral economics
has proven popular in the "is there inefficient discrimination?"
debate2 and has helped illuminate similar questions in other areas
of law economists more regularly analyze, such as compensation for
private property "takings"" d the rcaonblns. ehs of tort victim
behavior.23 This major gap in the scholarship probably traces to a
disconnect between those with practical knowledge of Title VII
litigation (practicing lawyers and some litigation scholars) and those
with knowledge about behavioral economics and happiness research
(economists and law professors steeped in economic theory). This
Article seeks to bridge this gap, which has left employment doctrine
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Funding for Disability
Accommodations: A Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the
ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 207-08 (1998) (noting how behavioral biases can yield
disability discrimination).
22. For an argument that the endowment effect justifies higher compensation than
"market value" in the context of government takings of real estate, see, for example, Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1541, 1533-34 (1998).
23. For criticism that the traditional conception of the tort law "reasonable person"
assumes an unrealistic ability to process information accurately and without vulnerability to
manipulation, see, for example, Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 634-35.
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flawed because of its unawareness of recent social science theories
and findings.
In sum, this Article suggests that based on behavioral and
happiness findings, courts should do the following: (1) reform
employment damages rules to provide greater damages for termi-
nated long-term employees, which judges could do under the
existing statutory scheme and case law; (2) cast a more critical eye
upon employer antidiscrimination programs that foster not positive
but negative emotions; and (3) cast a more understanding eye upon
whether employees complain internally about harassment, given
their understandable but underappreciated reluctance to risk
retaliation. This Article then discusses what those specific analyses
of employment law say about three broader, more theoretical
questions about what behavioral and happiness research have done,
for good or for ill, to the project of economic analysis of law.
First, have behavioral and happiness modifications to the old
"rational actor" model rendered economics too indeterminate to be
useful? This Article's employment law diagnoses are examples of
how economics still can provide useful analyses and prescriptions.
But they also are examples of how conclusions reachable with
behavioral- and happiness-infused economics are likely narrower
-for example, improving individual, "micro-level" determinations
like damages and reasonableness of party behavior-than many
past economic analyses on "macro" questions, like whether the
whole of Title VII is "efficient."24
Second, with social science-based economic analysis more often
prescribing regulation of free markets (such as employment laws
modifying employment at will), when do paternalistic regulations
help enough to be worth the transaction costs and incentive
distortions? Admittedly, this Article's proposals yield more complex,
transaction-costly rules, but regulation is more worth the cost in
higher-stakes, less-repeated transactions like employment (or
housing, mortgages, and so on) than in lower-stakes, often-repeated
transactions like consumer purchases. This Article thus differs from
legal scholarship that sees behavioral economics as justifying
regulating transactions both minor and major.25
24. See infra Part IIIA.
25. See infra Part III.B.
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Third, with behavioral and happiness research undercutting prior
economic models, should courts rely on this newer social science, or
instead decline to rely on social science at all, because each research
finding displaces prior ones? This Article's replacement of the old
with the new is a cautionary tale about relying upon social science,
especially current findings that have not stood the test of time. Yet
courts have no choice but to decide what damages make an em-
ployee whole, and what employee behavior is "reasonable," so they
cannot avoid using some conception of employee well-being and
cognition. Even imperfect new social science beats relying on
disproven, too-narrow "rationality" assumptions.2"
This Article thus offers a half-full/half-empty assessment of the
usefulness of behavioral and happiness research. It sounds a cau-
tionary note that social science cannot often assess broad policies,
but that it can improve decision making by judges, administrative
bodies, firms, and individuals. A premise of this Article-that
employment law ignores important research findings-is that social
science insights have been too slow to penetrate into noneconomic
scholarship and courts' decision making. The lag between academic
insight and real-world implementation can be long, at least for
applying deep threoy to practical _mittprs like damages and
litigation defenses. Pessimists may despair that academic knowl-
edge fails to improve the real world, but eventually critiques get
loud enough to force courts and policymakers to listen.
I. IMAKE-WHOLE" RELIEF: COMPENSATING NOTJUST MONETARY LOSS,
BUT ENDOWMENT Loss AND HAPPINESS Loss
A. How Relief Is Limited Primarily to Economic Loss in
Employment Discrimination Cases
In employment lawsuits alleging unlawful loss of a job, courts aim
to award relief that "make[s] persons whole for injuries suffered"27
-a concept that, to courts, primarily means awarding plaintiffs
economic damages in the amount of the pay they lost28 plus their
26. See infra Part III.C.
27. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
28. Id. (holding that awarding lost pay is presumptively appropriate because "the purpose
of Title VII [is] to make persons whole for injuries ... [from] discrimination"); Geller v.
2009]
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attorney's fees.29 Under Title VII as originally written, this "make-
whole" relief was limited to compensating "injuries of an economic
character," not emotional or physical injury.s Since 1991, plaintiffs
in most discrimination cases (race, sex, religion, and national origin
discrimination under Title VII, as well as disability discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities Act) also can recover com-
pensatory damages for "emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary
losses"'3' and punitive damages for violations committed "with
malice or with reckless indifference to [plaintiffs] federally pro-
tected rights."32
Even under employment statutes allowing noneconomic damages,
economic damages remain the main form of relief because emo-
tional distress and punitive damages are limited. In Title VII and
Americans with Disabilities Act claims, the total of compensatory
(emotional distress) and punitive damages faces a statutory cap of
$50,000-$300,000 (based on employer size). For other claims,
punitive and emotional distress damages are entirely unavailable,
including claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding similarly in age discrimination case
that, because courts should award "make-whole" relief to wronged plaintiffs, "the district
court ... [should] award pension rights to plaintiff' in addition to back pay).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006).
30. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418 ("Title VII deals with legal injuries of an
economic character occasioned by racial or other antiminority discrimination.").
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(3) (2006).
32. Id. § 1981A(b)(1).
33. Id. § 1981A(b)(3). Some plaintiffs can sue under statutes without a damages cap, such
as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination claims, which allows uncapped emotional distress
and punitive damages. Pavon v. Swift Transp. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1999). Some
state and local laws also allow uncapped emotional distress and/or punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 606 N.E.2d 1369 (N.Y. 1992), affg 563 N.Y.S.2d 968 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1990) (allowing uncapped emotional distress damages, but no punitive damages,
under New York law); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(a) (2008) (providing uncapped emotional
distress and punitive damages under New York City law). However, the federal damages cap
remains for most cases: Section 1981 covers only race claims, and state laws vary in
effectiveness, yielding a 'potluck' characteristic of state statutory schemes." Joseph J.
Shelton, In the Wake of Garrett." State Law Alternatives to the Americans with Disabilities Act,
52 CATm. U. L. REv. 837, 851 (2003); see Brent W. Landau, Note, State Employees and
Sovereign Immunity: Alternatives and Strategies for Enforcing Federal Employment Laws, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169,189-194 (2002) (deeming various state employment laws "insufficient"
because some disallow jury trials, allow lesser relief, or cover fewer groups or disabilities).
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ment Act,34 the National Labor Relations Act (as to antiunion
practices),35 and many state whistleblower laws. 6
1. The Limited Prospect of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are limited in two ways. First, by statute,
punitive damages are available for employment discrimination
only when the employer acted "with malice or with reckless indiffer-
ence" to employees' antidiscrimination rights." This means, under
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,3" that punitive damages are
unavailable if the employer proves that the discriminatory act of its
manager or agent was contrary to the employer's good faith antidis-
crimination efforts.39 Employers thereby can avoid punitive damages
for proven discrimination as long as they show the basic range of
garden-variety antidiscrimination policies that any reputable
company's human resources would administer-mainly a policy
against discrimination, an internal complaint procedure, and
diversity/discrimination training.4"
34. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) (listing forms of relief under ADEA); see Comm'r v. Schleier,
515 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1995) (noting that ADEA allows no emotional distress or punitive
damages, only liquidated damages that can double the economic daittge).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006); see Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 419-20 ("The [Title VII]
backpay provision was expressly modeled on the backpay provision of the National Labor
Relations Act. Under that Act, '(m)aking the workers whole for losses suffered on account of
an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy' .... [Tihe [National Labor
Relations] Board, since its inception, has awarded backpay as a matter of course ... and not
merely where employer violations are peculiarly deliberate, egregious, or inexcusable."
(citations omitted)).
36. Such state laws provide widely varied relief. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
15.363(1), (3) (West 2009) (providing emotional distress damages, but not punitive damages,
under Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-5 (West 2009)
(providing emotional distress and punitive damages under New Jersey Conscientious
Employee Protection Act); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(5) (McKinney 2008) (providing only back pay,
not emotional distress or punitive damages, under New York Whistleblower Law).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(b)(1) (2006).
38. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
39. Id. at 544.
40. See, e.g., Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctr., 333 F.3d 536,548-49 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
Kolstad defense satisfied by employer's "organization-wide Equal Employment Opportunity
Policy," which barred discrimination and instituted (1) a grievance policy encouraging
employees to report discrimination or harassment, (2) a diversity program of classes and
group exercises, and (3) a tracking of employee demographics by department); Cooke v.
Stefani Mgmt. Servs., 250 F.3d 564, 568-69 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding Kolstad defense satisfied
by employer program of promulgating a harassment policy, holding a seminar on harassment
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:183
Second, in any case allowing punitive damages (that is, not just
employment cases), the Due Process Clause imposes constitutional
limits on the size of the awards. Punitive damages cannot be too
many times greater than a plaintiffs actual damages,4 and in
employment cases in particular, absent exceptional circumstances,
the limit may be four or five times actual damages.42
In sum, punitive damages awards, especially large ones, are
rare.43 They are unavailable entirely for many claim types (by
for managers, and mounting an antiharassment poster, and rejecting employee's counter
argument that the internal complaint policy lacked a "bypass" provision, only allowing for
reporting to an employee's managers). But see Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794,810-11
(9th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases explaining circumstances when employer cannot establish
Kolstad defense: "the inaction of ... supervisors may be imputed to the employer if the
supervisors are made responsible, pursuant to company policy, for receiving and acting on
complaints of harassment.... [I]t is insufficient for an employer simply to have in place
antiharassment policies; it must also implement them.").
41. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (establishing that Due Process
Clause limits punitive damages awards); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 418 (2003) (limiting punitive damages based on "three guideposts: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility ... (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages ... and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases"). The most
specific guidance comes from State Farm:
[Flew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages ... will satisfy due process .... [R]atios greater ... may comport with due
process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount
of economic damages.... [A] higher ratio might be necessary where the injury is
hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm ... [is] difficult to
determine .... [H]owever[,] [w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then
a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee.
Id. at 425.
42. "Decisions involving discrimination claims ... have generally approved ratios of less
than 5:1" between punitive and actual damages. Chopra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d
230, 246 (D. Conn. 2007) (reducing punitive award from 10 to 4.3 times actual damages); see,
e.g., Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145, 162-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reducing punitive award
from $500,000 to $50,000 where actual damages were $15,000. "[A] punitive award
significantly above the $50,000 ... would reach broadly across the divide between an
appropriate award and an unconstitutional penalty .... lAin award of more than four times the
amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line.") (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S.
at 425) (emphasis added). Parrish featured "reprehensible" harassment exploiting the
plaintiffs "vulnerable economic position," but several factors limited award size-factors
applicable to most employment cases, "There was no violence or threat.... The actual harm ...
was economic, not physical .... [The record does not demonstrate that Parrish was financially
vulnerable to the point of being deprived of food, shelter or basic necessities." Id. at 163.
43. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
623, 635 (1997) (noting that punitive damages are awarded in less than 10 percent of jury
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statute or common law); even when allowed, they cannot be
awarded except upon certain showings (under Kolstad); even when
awarded, they are limited in size (under Due Process). Punitive
damages thus are not a significant factor in employment claims.44
2. The Limited Prospect of Emotional Distress Damages
Emotional distress damages likewise are limited by the case law.
Without a professional diagnosis that the illegal behavior caused
the plaintiff a specific psychiatric impairment, courts typically limit
emotional distress damages to four figures or low five figures.45 A
plaintiff can win more upon showing either a professional diagnosis
or personal evidence, typically corroborated by others, of impaired
psychological or physical well-being that had a significant quality-
of-life impact.46 Yet most higher awards are based upon actual
trials).
44. See Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation: Making Room for State Prosecution in the
Punitive Damages Process, 76 N.C. L. REV. 463, 514 (1998) ("Any reform that reduces the
frequency and size of punitive awards or drives down the settlement value of punitive claims
would tend to reduce (for good or ill) their impact on defendants.").
45. See. e.g., Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1996)
(upholding $7,500 award on Title VII hostile work environma tu xai 'hara.-n.-nt cl-i;fl in
which supervisor made numerous comments on plaintiffs sexual activities and personal life,
and plaintiff (with corroboration from co-worker) testified that she felt stressed, embarrassed,
belittled, disgusted, hopeless, and stupid); McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Rest., 83 F.3d 498 (1st
Cir. 1996) ($2,500 in damages for sexual harassment); Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
852 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1988) (awarding, on § 1981 race discrimination claim, $15,000 in
compensatory damages, and rejecting plaintiffs argument for more, on claim of emotional
distress and humiliation from employer's failure to promote him, when plaintiff did not face
public humiliation and did not seek counseling).
46. See, e.g., Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 130 F.3d 349 (8th Cir. 1997) (reducing
award from $150,000 to $50,000 when plaintiff presented evidence of emotional hurt plus
headaches, ulcer-like symptoms, and withdrawal from his wife as a result of a racially hostile
work environment); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding
$100,000 award on claim of discriminatory denial of promotion and retaliation: where
"[plaintiff], his wife and his son testified about the anxiety, sleeplessness, stress, depression,
high blood pressure, headaches, and humiliation he suffered[,] ... medical or other expert
evidence was not required to prove emotional distress"); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85
F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding award of $50,000 for plaintiff terminated for
contemplating an abortion, when witnesses testified plaintiff was upset and frightened after
termination, and where plaintiff testified she suffered nightmares, weight loss during
pregnancy, and nervousness: "plaintiffs can prove emotional injury by testimony without
medical support.... However, damages for mental and emotional distress will not be presumed,
and must be proven by 'competent evidence."); Ramsey v. Am. Air Filter Co.,.772 F.2d 1303,
1313 (7th Cir. 1985) (reducing award, on § 1981 race discrimination claim, from $75,000 to
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professional diagnoses (not just laypersons' testimony), plus
evidence of severe impact on the plaintiff.47
The best evidence that emotional distress awards tend to be low
absent professional medical evidence is that plaintiffs often waive
such damages to avoid intrusive discovery. A plaintiff may waive
any right to claim specific, substantial emotional distress, instead
claiming only modest, "garden-variety" emotional distress damages,
in order to prevent the defendant from obtaining intrusive discovery
such as a psychological exam of the plaintiff or discovery of plain-
tiff's otherwise private psychological records.48
$35,000, even though evidence showed plaintiff suffered mental anguish and humiliation,
because no medical evidence showed treatment for depression or emotional distress).
47. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 491 F.3d 790 (8th Cir.
2007) (upholding award of $100,000 for emotional damages to a wheelchair-using employee
with a rare bone condition, commonly known as brittle bone disease, terminated for excessive
tardiness, when the tardiness was caused by a lack of adequate handicap parking and
workspaces, and the disability could have been reasonably accommodated by extending the
employee's lunch break just fifteen minutes); Salinas v. O'Neill, 286 F.3d 827 (5th Cir. 2002)
(reducing $300,000 award to $150,000, when evidence showed that plaintiff suffered high
levels of paranoia about further retaliation by superiors, deteriorating relations with his
family, and numerous physician visits).
48. Compare Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 126 F.R.D. 422, 426 (D.
Mass. 1989) (disallowing defendant discovery of plaintiffs psychotherapy records because
plaintiff, by claiming only limited emotional distress damages, avoided placing his mental
condition at issue: "Sabree has not placed his mental condition at issue. Sabree makes a
'garden-variety' claim of emotional distress, not a claim of psychological injury or psychiatric
disorder resulting from the alleged discrimination."), with Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196
F.R.D. 562, 568-69 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (allowing discovery into plaintiffs psychotherapy: plaintiff
claimed more than modest emotional distress damages so "Defendants must be free to test
the ... contention that she is emotionally upset because of the defendants' conduct"). See also
Gatsas v. Manchester Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-315, 2006 WL 1424417, at *1 (D.N.H. May 17,
2006) ("Defendant moves to compel production of plaintiffs psychological records ... and for
a [psychological] examination.... If plaintiff clearly waives all but garden variety mental
anguish then the motion should be denied.... I therefore deny the motion but without prejudice
to renew if plaintiff does not make a written waiver.").
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3. The Lack of Distinction Between Hiring Discrimination
Damages and Termination Discrimination Damages
a. Back and Front Pay Calculations: Formulaic, but with
Uncertain Length of Pay Continuation
Compensating economic loss in an employment claim, especially
ongoing future losses, is a formulaic task for the judge in one
respect,49 but an arbitrary task in another respect. The award is
formulaic in that the basic annual loss is easily calculable, but
arbitrary as to how many years of annual damages to award the
plaintiff, an arbitrariness apparent in the following typical fact
pattern.
Assume a worker is fired from a $50,000 job in early 2009, then
is unemployed for a year, but then lands a $40,000 job in early 2010.
Assume that she sues in early 2010 (after satisfying all pre-suit
administrative requirements), presses the case through discovery
and motion practice for two years, and wins a verdict in early 2012.
She typically would win her lost pay, both "back pay" (covering the
period from termination to verdict) and "front pay" (from the verdict
date in the ffitair). 5 ° Back pay of one year of her $50,000 lost pay
49. Under Title VII and most other statutes, the judge, not jury, makes front pay awards.
See, e.g., Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Because
back pay and front pay have historically been recognized as equitable relief ... , neither party
was entitled to a jury trial."); McCue v. Kan. Dep't of Human Res., 165 F.3d 784, 791 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that judge, not jury, determines front pay); accord Allison v. Citgo Petrol.
Corp., 151 F.3d 402,423 n.19 (5th Cir. 1998); Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 613 (8th
Cir. 1997); Downes v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1141-42 (7th Cir. 1994); Duke
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir. 1991).
50. See Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that back pay runs
until verdict date, followed by reinstatement or front pay for ongoing losses); Shore v. Fed.
Express Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The back pay award is limited by the
date [ofi judgment.... Front pay is therefore simply compensation for the post-judgment
effects.").
Front pay need not be calculated when a court instead orders the plaintiff reinstated.
Although
it is a bedrock principle of discrimination law that reinstatement is the preferred
remedy[,] [and] [flront pay is described as simply a substitute for reinstatement,
... the notion that reinstatement is the preferred remedy is nothing but a legal
fiction. Neither the employee nor the employer, at the end of litigation over
employment discrimination, 'prefers' reinstatement, and courts rarely require
it.
Melissa Hart, Retaliatory Litigation Tactics: The Chilling Effects of 'After-Acquired Evidence,"
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(the year she was unemployed) plus two years of the $10,000 annual
pay gap between her current job and the job she lost, and front pay
of her $10,000 pay gap per year, all are awarded as a "lump sum" at
the time of the verdict.51
The formula gets murky because one of the key variables-the
number of years of pay continuation-is chosen at worst arbitrarily,
and at best by "intelligent guesswork" and calculations that "cannot
be totally accurate because they are prospective and necessarily
speculative."52 Courts base their front pay duration "guesswork" on
many factors, but as discussed immediately below,53 those factors do
not include whether the plaintiff brought a termination claim (that
is, loss of a job she had been holding) or a hiring claim (that is, loss
of a job she had applied for, without ever holding the job)-which is
a critical distinction, as discussed later.5 4
40 ARIz. ST. L.J. 401, 437-38 (2008) (citations omitted); see also Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII,
Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 583, 595 n.71 (1999) (citing studies "that
few employees accept reinstatement if it is offered, and those who do are often discharged or
leave quickly"). Courts commonly award front pay by finding reinstatement not appropriate
for any number of reasons: "where the plaintiff has found other work," Arban v. West Pub.
Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 406 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); where the employer does not have
a position open, Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); where
after discrimination and litigation "the employer-employee relationship ... [is] irreparably
damaged by animosity," id.; where reinstatement would displace another employee, Ogden
v. Wax Works, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (N.D. Iowa 1998); or where any other factors
make reinstatement impractical or less desirable than a simple front pay award, id. (collecting
cases listing varied factors).
Reinstatement is more common in union-administered grievance proceedings, likely
because a union strong enough to press a grievance makes reinstatement to a hostile
employer more feasible. Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the
Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 920 (1994) (documenting that
without union protection, reinstatement works badly due to employer hostility). This Article
does not oppose reinstatement when feasible; it just focuses on the substantial body of cases
in which reinstatement is, for good or ill, uncommon.
51. Downes, 41 F.3d at 1141 n.8 (noting that although "front pay" compensates ongoing
losses, courts award it "as 'a lump sum ... representing the discounted present value of the
difference between the earnings [plaintiff] would have received in his old employment and the
earnings he can be expected to receive in his present and future ... employment."' (citations
omitted)).
52. Reneau v. Wayne Griffin & Sons, Inc., 945 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted); see also Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[B]ecause
future damages are often speculative,' flexibility and wide discretion are especially
important." (quoting Fite v. First Tenn. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 1988))).
53. See infra Part I.A.3.b.
54. See infra Part I.B.
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b. Factors Determining Duration of Front and Back
Pay-Which Do Not Distinguish Hiring from Termination
Courts provide lengthy and varied, but ultimately similar, lists of
the factors relevant to front pay duration. One court, surveying the
case law, compiled the following fairly comprehensive list of factors:
(1) the plaintiffs age;
(2) the length of time the plaintiff was employed by the
defendant employer;
(3) the likelihood the employment would have continued absent
the discrimination;
(4) the length of time it will take the plaintiff, using reasonable
effort, to secure comparable employment;
(5) the plaintiffs work and life expectancy;
(6) the plaintiffs status as an at-will-employee;
(7) the length of time other employees typically held the
position lost;
(8) the plaintiffs ability to work;
(9) the plaintiffs ability to work for the defendant-employer;
(10) the employee's efforts to mitigate damages; and
(11) the ar .unt of any iquidae d nr ninitive damaae award.55
55. Ogden, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 ("Of course this list is not all-inclusive.") (collecting
cases) (citations omitted); see McInnis v. Fairfield Cmty., Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1146 (10th Cir.
2006) (listing factors such as "work life expectancy, salary and benefits at the time of
termination, any potential increase in salary through regular promotions and cost of living
adjustment, the reasonable availability of other work opportunities, the period within which
the plaintiff may become reemployed with reasonable efforts, and methods to discount any
award to net present value" (quoting Whittington v. Nordham Group, Inc., 429 F.3d 986,
1000-01 (10th Cir. 2005))); Arban, 345 F.3d at 406 (listing factors such as "[the] employee's
duty to mitigate, the availability of employment opportunities, the period within which one
by reasonable efforts may be reemployed, the employee's work and life expectancy, ... the
present value of future damages and other factors"') (citations omitted); Barbour, 48 F.3d at
1280 (noting that factors "include, but are not necessarily limited to [plaintiff] Barbour's age
... [and] intention to remain at [defendant employer] until retirement ... ; the length of time
[employees] ... typically held that position; how long Rich [the person hired instead of plaintiff]
held that position; the length of time persons in similar positions at other companies generally
hold those positions; Barbour's efforts at mitigation (including ... job market and industry
conditions, as well as the amount of time reasonably required for Barbour to secure
comparable employment); and ... [evidence supporting defendant's] claim that Barbour would
not have remained ... until his retirement"); Reneau, 945 F.2d at 871 (listing the "length of
prior employment, the permanency of the position held, the nature of work, the age and
physical condition of the employee, possible consolidation of jobs and the myriad other
nondiscriminatory factors which could validly affect the ... post-discharge employment
2009]
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The list of front pay factors does include duration of employment
(#2)-but not as a way to estimate the psychological, endowment, or
happiness loss that a termination caused. Rather, this and most
other front pay factors aim to estimate (1) how many more years the
plaintiff would have spent at that job, but for the employer's
discrimination (factors 1-3 and 5-9 above), as well as (2) whether,
because of other wages or compensation the plaintiff may earn, an
award of less than full pay continuation would suffice as full relief
(factors 4, 10, and 11).
The one case expressly noting a difference between the impact of
not being hired and the impact of being terminated is, oddly, not
even a Title VII case. In a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
decision about government affirmative action, the Supreme Court
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education58 rejected an affirmative
action plan that gave members of racial minorities more protection
against layoffs than their seniority levels warranted." The Court
distinguished affirmative action racial preferences in hiring from
such preferences in layoffs, because being terminated has a greater
impact than not being hired:
[H]iring goals ... simply do not impose the same kind of injury
that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity
is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job.... While hiring goals
impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several
opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving
racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in the
serious disruption of their lives.5"
While aptly noting a distinction between termination and
nonhiring, Wygant has not established any such distinction in the
Title VII damages jurisprudence.59 More broadly, Wygant does not
quite note that termination imposes a greater risk of endowment
and happiness loss than nonhiring. In focusing on how nonhiring
relationship as factors").
56. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
57. Id. at 283-84 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.).
58. Id. at 282-83.
59. We are aware of no cases drawing that distinction, and no relevant cases arose in a
fairly broad Westlaw search of cases citing Wygant that contained the following terms:
(terminat! fire!firing) Is (hire! hiring) Is (damages relief "front pay" "back pay").
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"often foreclos[es] only one of several opportunities," Wygant seems
to be saying that nonhiring is less likely to result in economic
(income) loss: the nonhired often pursue "several [job] opportunities"
simultaneously, so losing just one job possibility is less certain to
cause income loss than termination is.
60
In short, Wygant was insightful as to the hiring/termination
distinction, but it did not, as this Article does, note how termination
and nonhiring inflict different nonmonetary losses. It also did not
advocate any damages distinction between termination and
nonhiring. Additionally, its hiring-versus-termination insight has
gone unfortunately unnoticed in the ensuing decades of Title VII
jurisprudence. Thus, the cases on employment damages draw no
distinction between the losses due to an unlawful failure to hire and
an unlawful termination, much less between unlawful terminations
of short- and long-term employees.6
B. Why Relief for Termination Presumptively Should Exceed
Economic Loss: Endowment Value and Happiness Impact
For two reasons, it is inadequate for employment damages in
termination ulairns, as dissthn ft hiring claims, to be based
presumptively on economic loss, with little or no additional award.
First, due to the endowment effect, someone terminated from an
existing job often suffers greater loss than someone merely not hired
60. Other passages of Wygant are cryptic as to whether they focus on income or other
harms; in noting that terminated employees are more likely to suffer "serious disruption of
their lives," Wygant may have meant disruption due to income loss, due to traditionally
compensable emotional distress, or due to something like endowment or happiness loss. Id.
at 283.
61. Courts do tend to award more in age discrimination cases, which (because they feature
older workers) tend to involve terminated longer-term employees, but that does not mean
longer-tenured plaintiffs are receiving compensation for their greater psychological loss,
because the federal age discrimination statute does not allow emotional distress damages at
all. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). Thus, age discrimination damages cover only lost wages,
and "[slome of the higher wages recouped by older employees are undoubtedly attributable
to job-specific skills." Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return
of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1786-87 (1996). In sum, some age discrimination
plaintiffs recover more damages because their longer tenure yields higher economic (not
endowment or happiness) losses. Firm-specific human capital is destroyed by terminations
of longer-term employees who cannot find similarly high-paid work elsewhere. See infra note
177 (on Padilla and other cases awarding lengthy front pay when workers with job- or firm-
specific skills cannot find similarly paid work).
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into a new job.62 Second, studies show that unemployment causes a
long-term loss of happiness, so firing a worker typically causes
greater harm than not hiring someone who held another job or
already was unemployed through no fault of the discriminatory
employer.63 For both of these reasons, the damages to make whole
a terminated employee (especially a long-term employee) are greater
than those needed to make whole an individual not hired into a new
job. 64
1. Strong Evidence, but Still-Heated Debate, over Existence and
Extent of an Endowment Effect
Whether an "endowment effect" exists in employment depends on
whether endowment effects exist at all-a topic of heated scholarly
debate. Traditional rational-actor economics "assumes that the
value of an entitlement to an individual is independent of ...
[whether] she presently owns" that entitlement.65 Under that view,
"[a]n individual may prefer to own either a house in the city or a
house in the country, but the location of the house that she pres-
ently owns should not affect her preference."" Yet a "robust body of
social science scholarship" disproves that assumption, Professor
Russell Korobkin notes:67
[P]eople tend to value goods more when they own them than
when they do not. Move a person from a city house to a country
house and ... he is quite likely to prefer the country house more
than he did when he resided in the city .... [T]he "status quo
bias" ... is often used interchangeably ... but actually has a
slightly broader connotation: individuals tend to prefer the
present state of the world to alternative states, all other things
being equal.'
62. See infra Part I.B.2.
63. See infra Part I.B.3.
64. See infra Part I.C.
65. Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1228.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1228-29 (citations omitted).
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"[A] broad array of experiments ... demonstrates that the
[endowment] effect is robust across different types of endowments,"
Korobkin recounts.69 One experiment gave half the subjects coffee
mugs and then offered to trade a large Swiss chocolate bar for the
mug; the other half received the chocolate and were allowed to trade
for the mug.70 The assignments were arbitrary, so traditional
rationality sees no reason those given a mug would like mugs better
than those given chocolate, or vice-versa, so one would expect
similar preferences among each group. That is, if X percent of
subjects preferred the mug to the chocolate, that percentage should
be identical in both groups. To the contrary, 90 percent of those
given chocolate preferred to keep it rather than trade it for a mug,
and almost 90 percent of those given mugs preferred to keep it
rather than trade it for chocolate.7'
Experiments that ask subjects to price goods find a roughly two-
to-one 'offer-asking gap,' ... demand[ing] a higher price to sell a
good that they possess than they would pay for the same good if
they did not possess it at present., 72 The most famous experiment
"provided one-half of their subjects with a coffee mug bearing the
Cornell University logo ... [and] told the subjects who received the
.. L . 1 h'."I -1-n nnnortlnitv to sell it, and ... [gave] the
remainder of subjects ... an opportunity to purchase one of the
mugs. 73 Traditional rationality "predicts that eleven [of twenty-two
possible] mug trades would take place (50 percent) because there is
only a 50 percent chance that any seller would value a mug more
than would any buyer. 74 Yet only one to four trades occurred,
because sellers' asking prices exceeded buyers' offers; the same
occurred in experiments involving pens. All yielded a similar two-to-
one ratio between sellers' willingness to accept (WTA) and buyers'
willingness to pay (WTP). 5 The only well-documented exceptions
are goods with objective values, such as a token or chip redeemable
69. Id. at 1235.
70. Id. at 1233 (citing Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of
Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1228.
73. Id. at 1234 (citing Kahneman, infra note 76).
74. Id.
75. Id. ("[Mug] buyers provided a median WTP [willingness to pay] of $2.25 to $2.75, and
sellers provided a median WTA [willingness to accept] of $5.25 each time.").
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for a cash sum, because whether one owns it or not, everyone agrees
that (for example) a $10 chip and a $10 bill have equal value.76
Theorized sources of the endowment effect have varied. Initially
it was depicted as an anomaly, an asymmetry in valuation.77 More
recently, based upon experimental findings that chimpanzees and
monkeys display endowment effects, it has been depicted as an
evolutionary biological fact.78 Other proposed mechanisms are
cognitive focus during evaluation and emotional attachments,79 and
preferences that depend on rationally expected reference points. 0
Further showing an innate aspect to endowment effects are
neuroeconomic studies finding neural correlates consistent with loss
aversion,"l and other experimental findings that even large
increases in age and experience do not reduce apparent endowment
effects.8 2 Related experiments have analyzed the roles in endow-
ment effects of emotions that people either anticipate they will feel
in the future or merely incidentally feel in the present (for example,
regret about giving up something).,3
This breadth of evidence does not, however, make the endowment
effect uncontroversial, or easy to assume it is present. "[A]lthough
76. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1332 tbl.2 (1990); Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg,
Buying and Selling Exchange Goods: Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect, 17 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 517 (1996).
77. Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,
J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194.
78. Sarah F. Brosnan et al., Endowment Effect in Chimpanzees, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY
1704 (2008); M. Keith Chen et al., How Basic Are Behavioral Biases? Evidence from Capuchin
Monkey Trading Behavior, 114 J. POL. ECON. 517 (2006); Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan,
Law, Biology, and Property: A New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1935, 1988 (2008); Venkat Lakshminaryanan et al., Endowment Effect in Capuchin Monkeys,
363 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOCY B. 3837 (2008).
79. Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, How Do Intentions Affect Loss Aversion?, 62
J. MARKETING RES. 139 (2005).
80. Botond Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 121
Q.J. ECON. 1133 (2006).
81. George Loewenstein et al., Neuroeconomics, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 647,652-55 (2008)
(reviewing neuroeconomics literature about loss aversion).
82. William Harbaugh et al., Are Adults Better Behaved Than Children? Age, Experience,
and the Endowment Effect, 70 ECON. LETTERS 175 (2001).
83. Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Heart Strings and Purse Strings: Carryover Effects of
Emotions on Economic Decisions, 15 PSYCHOL. SI. 337 (2004); Chien-Huang Lin et al., The
Role of Emotions in the Endowment Effect, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 589 (2006); Ying Zhanga &
Ayelet Fishbach, The Role of Anticipated Emotions in the Endowment Effect, 15 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 316 (2005).
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the effect has proven robust across a range of contexts," Korobkin
notes, "there is no a priori reason to believe that the effect will be
equally pronounced, or even exist at all, in all contexts."' The
following factors affect the presence or size of the effect:
" Uncertainty of value. A prerequisite for the effect is that
the good's value must be uncertain (unlike a token re-
deemable for a fixed sum). 5
" Limited information. 'The more difficult it is for individu-
als to compare two items in a proposed trade, the larger
the effect tends to be," 6 such as when little is known
about the goods at issue. 7
" Earned assignment. The effect is larger "when the good is
obtained as a result of skill or performance," such as when
good work on a task determines who gets the good,'
"rather than as a result of chance."8 9
" Lack of market substitutes. "[T]he endowment effect is
more robust for entitlements with no close market substi-
tutes,"9 like foods better-or worse-screened for pathogens,
than for goods with well-defined markets, like mass-
produced candy bars;91 a survey of dozens of studies found
the endowment ef..e. --1"hihest public ond non-market
goods, next highest for ordinary private goods, and lowest
for ... money."92
" The irrelevance of legal "entitlement." The endowment
effect even applies to things there is no legal entitlement
to continue enjoying (for example, high levels of customer
84. Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1241.
85. Id. at 1237.
86. Id.
87. Eric van Dijk & Daan van Knippenberg, Trading Wine: On the Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and the Comparability of Consumer Goods, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 485 (1998).
88. Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1236; see George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source
Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 161-64 (1994)
(finding 30 percent higher valuation by those told they received a mug due to their high
performance, compared to those told they received it randomly).
89. Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1236.
90. Id. at 1238.
91. Jason F. Shogren et al., Resolving Differences in Willingness To Pay and Willingness
To Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 255, 259-64 (1994).
92. John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP Studies, 44 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 427 (2002).
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service),93 so what matters is possession or enjoyment, not
formal ownership or rights to continued enjoyment.94
A stronger note of caution comes from Professors Charles Plott
and Kathryn Zeiler, the most prominent dissenters to the view that
an "endowment effect" explains differences between willingness to
pay and willingness to accept. 9 Plott and Zeiler note that no
endowment effect appeared in certain studies that either gave
subjects real monetary incentives (rather than asking what they
would do in hypothetical situations) or gave subjects practice rounds
or "training" before their trades.9" To Plott and Zeiler, such studies
show that endowment effects "are not reliably observed across
experimental designs" and that "experimental procedures might
account for the differences." 7 Plott and Zeiler conclude that while
"many broad claims have been made regarding the robustness of the
[valuation] gap," scholars seeing evidence of "endowment effects"
are making "an incorrect interpretation of experimental results."98
Korobkin disagrees with Plott and Zeiler. "[T]he weight of the
evidence suggests that it is extremely unlikely that the effect is
merely an artifact of the experimental methods that demonstrate
it,"99 given the wide range of settings featuring endowment effects.'
As discussed below,' some of the Plott/Zeiler evidence may actually
support Korobkin's view that endowment effects exist, but are
context-specific.
93. Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. ECON.
141, 143-44 (1991).
94. Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1235-36.
95. See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly
Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV.
1449 (2007) [hereinafter Plott & Zeiler, Exchange]; Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The
Willingness to Pay- Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect, "Subject Misconceptions,
and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 537 (2005)
[hereinafter Plott & Zeiler, Willingness].
96. Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra note 95, at 532-34.
97. Id. at 542.
98. Id. at 531.
99. Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1243.
100. Id. at 1242-47.
101. See infra Part I.B.2.
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2. Is There an Endowment Effect for Jobs? The Evidence from
Experimental Studies
So is there an endowment effect in jobs? There is some, but little,
literature on the point, in part because of the impossibility of good
experimental evidence.
Professor Ian Ayres and student Fredrick Vars proposed, based
on evidence from laboratory experiments asking questions about
hypothetical jobs, that employees have an endowment effect in their
jobs, and that this explains courts' mixed responses to affirmative
action plans." 2 Professor Samuel Issacharoff also has suggested
that there probably is an endowment effect in jobs,' °3 and one
experiment provides supporting evidence. Having assigned some
subjects to a (fictional) higher-paying job and others to a better-
working-conditions job, Professors Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky found that most declined a chance to trade for the other
job,10 4 just as mug- and chocolate-owners declined to trade in
experiments about physical goods.0 5 Professor Zeiler, however,
notes that her experimental results with Professor Plott call such
evidence into question and suggest that judges' decisions do not
suggest an ondcwme.-nt effect in Jobs'
0 6
Yet any employment experiment is unlikely to be conclusive
because it is destined to be hypothetical; experimenters cannot
actually wield the power to fire forty individuals from actual jobs,
and refuse to hire forty others into jobs they actually want. While
102. Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public
Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577,1617 & n.139 (1998); Fredrick E. Vars, Attitudes
Toward Affirmative Action: Paradox or Paradigm?, in RACE VERSUS CLASS: THE NEW
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 73 (Carol M. Swain ed., 1996) (applying loss aversion to
affirmative action).
103. Issacharoff, supra note 61, at 1802 ('The endowment effect would predict that
jobholders would value their positions more than would people in an undifferentiated job
market. Having a particular job should endow the incumbent ... with a greater attachment
to it and give it greater value than would the market at large.").
104. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL.
341, 348 (1984).
105. See Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness To Pay and Compensation Demanded:
Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507
(1984).
106. Kathryn Zeiler, The Endowment Effect: Implications of Recent Empirical
Developments for Legal Theory 28 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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data from hypothetical decisions beats no data, a lack of monetary
incentive makes subjects less thoughtful about their decisions, 10 7
especially compared to the sustained thought people give real career
decisions. People also often make career decisions based at least in
part on such emotional factors and personal reasons as duty, family,
and loyalty; such idiosyncratic and path-dependent variables are
hard to replicate in experiments.
There are two reasons to believe, however, that there is an
endowment effect in employment. First, as discussed below,108 an
independent line of scholarship on happiness shows that job loss
imposes a surprisingly substantial and sustained happiness loss,
which corroborates the notion that job loss causes substantially
more harm than the undisputed economic losses it generates.
Second, the body of experimental studies indicates what sorts of
goods or entitlements yield an endowment, and employment
features all the factors that make endowment value present and
substantial in size:
" Uncertain value. The "value" to an individual of a job is
only partly monetary, as known by anyone who has turned
down a high-paying job for a more subjectively desirable,
less grueling, or more fulfilling job.
" Limited information. It is hard to compare one's job to a
new job about which one cannot have full information.0 9
Is the workplace culture cooperative or competitive? Is
the boss a jerk? How pressured are deadlines? Under
what conditions are employees disciplined or fired (a ques-
tion new hires cannot easily ask for fear of signaling
shirking)?"0
107. See, e.g., Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra note 95, at 537 ("Lack of incentives can be
associated with ... arbitrary behavior .... [A]ttention, thought, and care in understanding
instructions depend on ... incentives. If earnings depend on subjects' decisions, subjects
probably are more likely to allocate attention ... during experiments.").
108. See infra Part I.B.3.
109. Issacharoff, supra note 61, at 1799 ("[P]arties are inherently handicapped in their
capacity to fully explicate the terms of a long-term contractual relationship at the point of
hire.").
110. Id. at 1794-95 ("ifIt is extraordinarily difficult for employees to discuss conditions of
discharge ... without signaling concern that she may be a laggard.").
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" Earned assignment. Employees "earn" jobs in a very real
sense, by getting hired over other applicants; similarly,
workers get promoted (or just keep jobs) by being better
than the employer's other options.
" Lack of market substitutes. There is no real market for
exchanging jobs, given that a job is not something an
employee can just trade with another employee without
going through both employers' hiring process.
" Irrelevance of legal "entitlement." Most employees are "at
will," with no legal right to the job, but incumbents
(though not new hires) have experienced possession and
enjoyment of the job, the relevant factor.
Some aspects of the Plott/Zeiler analysis actually support the
above pro-"endowment" view. Admittedly, Plott and Zeiler are
endowment skeptics who do not see the evidence that way; further,
some of the factors they cite that affect endowment value-like
implied messages from experimenters that subjects should keep
rather than trade goods" '-support their view that endowment
effects "are not reliably observed across experimental designs ....
[E]xperimental procedures might account for the differences."' 2 Yet
other factors are not qn iPssilv dismissed as artificial conditions. For
example, studies show endowment effects when only "seller"
subjects had a mug to trade, but not when the buyer and seller
equally held a mug the seller had the right to sell. 1 ' To Plott and
Zeiler, these studies prove endowments are artifacts of experiment
conditions, yet they corroborate a key, real distinction. What
generates endowment value is not formal legal entitlement, but
actual enjoyment or possession."'
111.
[S]ignaling theories suggest that experimenter choice of which good to endow
might influence choices if subjects interpret the experimenter's choice as a signal
of relative quality .... [A]symmetries of choice unrelated to the value of the goods
might occur if subjects feel obliged to avoid rejecting a good perceived as a gift
from the experimenter.
Plott & Zeiler, Exchange, supra note 95, at 1450.
112. Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra note 95, at 542.
113. Plott and Zeiler found no endowment effect in this variation of the mug experiments.
"All subjects were handed a mug before the start of the round. Sellers were told that they
owned the mug. Buyers were told that they could inspect the mug but they did not own it."
Id. at 539.
114. See supra notes 93-94 (noting this factor in the presence or absence of endowment
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In short, Plott and Zeiler offer an important note of caution:
endowment effects may not be as omnipresent as some assert.
Employment, however, remains a setting featuring all the factors
that yield a substantial endowment effect. Just as Plott and Zeiler
do not share a consensus about how to interpret their experimental
results,"5 we also respectfully differ over whether existing data
supports endowment effects in jobs.
3. Happiness Economics Evidence: Job Loss Yields
Substantially More Harm than the Income Loss
While the endowment effect's use in legal scholarship is relatively
recent (mostly this decade)," 6 a still more recent field of scholar-
ship-happiness economics, more formally the economics of
subjective well-being--demonstrates that job loss yields a surpris-
ingly large and durable happiness loss." 7 There is overwhelming
empirical evidence that life satisfaction does not adapt to the
duration of an unemployment spell,"' including data from several
large-scale national and multinational surveys."'
Unemployment has a long-term scarring psychological effect, and
having a past experience of unemployment lowers ongoing subjec-
tive well-being. 20 For example, one fifteen-year longitudinal study
found that, on average, people who suffer unemployment never
effects).
115. Plott & Zeiler, Willingness, supra note 95, at 542.
116. Law review citations to endowment effects increased fivefold from 2001 to 2003 alone.
Korobkin, supra note 3, at 1229.
117. See, e.g., FREY, supra note 2, at 45-53 (summarizing research); HARING & STORBECK,
supra note 6, at 28 (same); PETER WARR, WORK, HAPPINESS, AND UNHAPPINESS (2007); Andrew
E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, Unhappiness and Unemployment, 104 ECON. J. 648 (1994)
(finding the unemployed report less happiness and poorer mental health); Andrew J. Oswald,
Happiness and Economic Performance, 107 ECON. J. 1815 (1997); Andrew E. Clark, Work,
Jobs and Well-Being Across the Millennium (Apr. 2, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
30/3/38315809.pdf.
118. Liliana Winkelmann & Rainer Winkelmann, Why Are the Unemployed So Unhappy?
Evidence from Panel Data, 65 ECONOMICA 1 (1998).
119. Andrew E. Clark, A Note on Unhappiness and Unemployment Duration (Institute for
the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 2406, 2006), available at http://ftp.iza.org
dp2406.pdf.
120. Andrew E. Clark et al., Scarring: The Psychological Impact of Past Unemployment, 68
ECONOMICA 221 (2001); Wiji Arulamalam et al., Unemployment Scarring, 111 ECON. J. F577
(2001).
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fully returned to their former levels of life satisfaction, even after
becoming re-employed.'2 Past unemployment scars, two economists
have argued, because it increases fears of future unemployment, an
insecurity that decreases happiness.122 This proposed explanation
of scarring draws support from empirical findings that even when
employed, people during recessions experience fear and upset about
the prospect of unemployment, so unemployment rates decrease
average happiness even for those still employed.'23
Unemployment not only is costly in terms of increased unhappi-
ness 24 but also worsens mental and physical health outcomes.
25
The nonmonetary costs of unemployment far exceeded the monetary
costs in numerous large-scale studies of various countries, 2 6 in-
121. Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 8 (2004).
122. Andreas Knabe & Steffen Ritzel, Scarring or Scaring? The Psychological Impact of
Past Unemployment and Future Unemployment Risk, (CESIFO, Working Paper No. 2457,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1299535.
123. Survey data from a quarter of a million randomly sampled Americans and Europeans
from the 1970s to the 1990s in response to questions about self-reported happiness reveal that
levels of national unemployment and inflation negatively impact life satisfaction, with a 1
percent increase in the unemployment rate having about twice the effect on unhappiness as
a 1 percent increase in the inflation rate. Rafael Di Tells, Robert J. MacCullough & Andrew
i. Oswaid, Prejerences Ouer fiaiiwn UEi-.. .. ;i ...... E,'...., . .
Happiness, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 335, 340 (2001). Specifically, recessions induce large reductions
in subjective well-being above and beyond the drop in national income, and increased
unemployment benefits are associated with increased national well-being. Rafael Di Tells,
Robert J. MacCullough & Andrew J. Oswald, The Macroeconomics of Happiness, 85 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 809 (2003). Corroborating evidence comes from data showing that public sector
employees, who enjoy greater average job security due to civil service protections and the
limited prospect of employer bankruptcy, do not lose as much happiness due to high
unemployment rates as private sector employees do. Simon Luechinger et al., Why Does
Unemployment Hurt the Employed? Evidence from the Life Satisfaction Gap between the
Public and the Private Sector (Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No.
3385, 2008), available at http://ftp.org/dp3385.pdf.
124. Justin Wolfers, Is Business Cycle Volatility Costly? Evidence from Surveys of Subjective
Well-Being, 6 INT'L FIN. 1 (2003).
125. Mary P. Merva & Richard Fowles, Economic Outcomes & Mental Health, in BACK TO
SHARED PROSPERITY: THE GROWING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH AND INCOME IN AMERICA 69 (Ray
F. Marshall ed., 1999); MARY P. MERVA & RICHARD FOWLES, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE,
EFFECTS OF DIMINISHED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES ON SOCIAL STRESS: HEART ATTACKS,
STROKES, AND CRIMES (1992), http://www.epinet.org/page/-/old/briefingpapers/1992_bp-
stress.pdf.
126. Liliana Winkelmann & Rainer Winkelmann, Unemployment: Where Does It Hurt?,
(Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 1093, 1995) (finding that of the total
costs of unemployment on well-being, between 85-93 percent are nonmonetary and at most
7-15 percent are monetary costs).
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cluding studies based on United States General Social Survey (GSS)
data,'27 Britain Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data,2 ' Dutch
data,129 German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEP) data, 130 Italian
data, 3 ' Swedish data,'32 and Swiss data.133 Cross-country studies
find similar conclusions for eleven European countries, 3 4 twenty-
three central and Eastern European countries,135 and youth in
twenty-three countries.'36 The effects of unemployment cut across
not only nations, but social classes. One study (based on GSEP data)
found no evidence that social capital moderates the negative effects
of unemployment.'37
The robust empirical finding that most people fail to adapt
emotionally to unemployment is all the more surprising given the
overwhelming data that people do adapt to most positive and neg-
ative events alike. 3 ' People underestimate their own capacity for
127. David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in Britain and the
USA, 88 J. PUBLIC ECON. 1359 (2004).
128. Andrew E. Clark & Andrew J. Oswald, Unhappiness and Unemployment, 104 ECON.
J. 648 (1994).
129. Isolde Wottiez & Jules Theeuwes, Well-Being and Labor Market Status, in THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WELFARE AND HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 211
(Stephen P. Jenkins et al., eds. 1998).
130. Knut Gerlach & Gesine Stephan, A Paper on Unhappiness and Unemployment in
Germany, 52 ECON. LETTERS 325 (1996); Winkelmann & Winkelmann, supra note 118.
131. Vincenzo Scoppa & Michela Ponzo, An Empirical Study of Happiness in Italy, 8 B.E.
J. OF ECON. ANALYSIS & POL., Article 15, available at http://www.bepress.comcgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1965&content=bejeap ("[Unemployment is extremely bad for subjective well-
being.).
132. Tomas Korpi, Is Utility Related to Employment Status? Employment, Unemployment,
Labor Market Policies and Subjective Well-Being among Swedish Youth, 4 LABOUR ECON. 125
(1997).
133. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness, Economy and Institutions, 110 ECON. J. 918
(2000).
134. Di Tella, MacCullough & Oswald, Macroeconomics of Happiness, supra note 123.
135. David G. Blanchflower, Unemployment, Well-Being and Wage Curves in Eastern and
Central Europe, 15 J. JAPANESE & INT'L ECONOMTES 364 (2001).
136. David G. Blanchflower, Youth Labor Markets in Twenty-Three Countries: A
Comparison Using Micro Data, in SCHOOL To WORK TRANSITIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES: A
COMPARATIvE ANALYSIS (David Stern, ed.) (forthcoming).
137. Rainer Winkelmann, Unemployment, Social Capital, and Subjective Well-Being, 10 J.
HAPPINESS STUD. 421 (2009).
138. See, e.g., Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness
Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1978); Shane Frederick & George
Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC
PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999); Eunkook Suh et al., Events and
Subjective Well-Being: Only Recent Events Matter, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1091
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"hedonic" (happiness) adaptation because they overestimate the
duration and intensity of the impact of an external event.139 Legal
scholars are starting to explore the legal implications of such
affective misforecasting, 4 ° with several engaged in a heated ongoing
debate about whether emotional distress damages, for example,
should be lower than they typically are, because people adapt to
negative events (for example, physical disability) more than they,
and juries, expect.141 Others, however, caution against too quickly
changing legal doctrine on the premise that people adapt to losses,
given more recent empirical and longitudinal findings about he-
donic adaptation and proposed explanations for those findings. 42
Specifically, recent evidence finds that hedonic adaptation is neither
as complete nor as ubiquitous as once thought.'43 Things people
simply fail to adapt to emotionally include depression and chronic
(1996).
*X3**. LL.~2~*u Lixh...lA~h T' n., NN- P ,-i,t, l,fu,,
Feelings, in WELL-BEING, supra note 138, at 85; Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert,
Affective Forecasting, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131 (2005); see also DANIEL
GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); TIMOTHY WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES:
DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 137-58 (2004); Kenneth Savitsky, Magic Kisses and
Mispredictions: A Review of Daniel Gilbert's (2006) Stumbling on Happiness, 3 J. POSITIVE
PSYCHOL. 76 (2008).
140. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective
Forecasting, 80 IND. L. J. 155, 165-81 (2005).
141. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007); John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008); George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and
the Role of Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1795 (2008);
Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157 (2008); Peter A. Ubel & George
Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn't Be (Just) About Pain and Suffering,
37 J. LEGAL STUD. S195 (2008).
142. Peter H. Huang, Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 50 (2008), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/
108/50_Huang.pdf; Rick Swedloff, Accounting for Happiness in Civil Settlements, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 39 (2008), available at http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/
108/39_Swedloff.pdf.
143. See Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness,
85 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
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pain,' loud and unpleasant noises, 4 5 and spousal separation.'46
Three legal scholars recently summarized studies of disabilities to
which people do not adapt:
Low-level, chronic stimuli like noise, dull pain, and headaches
have substantial long-term effects on happiness, as do diseases
associated with progressive deterioration. [In] [o]ne study, ...
instead of adapting to noise ... [people] became sensitized to it,
experiencing higher levels of annoyance as time went on ....
[People are less likely to adapt to unemployment and negative
changes in marital status such as widowhood .... [C]hronic or
progressive disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis and multiple
sclerosis appear to be resistant to adaptation in part due to
the[ir] deteriorating nature.... [E]ven where hedonic adaptation
occurs, it is neither inevitable nor invariable. Although adapta-
tion ... [exists] in the aggregate, individuals experience a range
of responses.147
There are numerous theories why and when people do and do not
experience hedonic adaptation, including these five: 4 ' (1) variation
in happiness is mostly due to personality and disposition (whether
genetic or ingrained early in life), not external events (for example,
cheerful people respond cheerfully to bad news; pessimists respond
with paranoia to good news);' 49 (2) people's repeated experiences
of the same external event alter the reference points from which
they compare new experiences (for example, after a certain amount
of time in prison, one defines downward what constitutes a "good
day");' (3) happiness derives more from pursuing rather than
144. Peter A. Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies
between Health State Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 QUALITY OF LIFE RES.
599 (2003).
145. Neil D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence against Adaptation, 2 J.
ENv'rL PSYCHOL. 87 (1982).
146. RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS 64-65 (2005); Richard E. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All
Wounds: A Longitudinal Study of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945
(2005) (finding that adaptation in people's life satisfaction to divorce is not complete).
147. John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1530-31 (2008) (citations omitted).
148. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 411-15.
149. David Lykken & Auke Tellegen, Happiness is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYCHOL.
Sci. 186 (1996).
150. ALLEN PARDUCCI, HAPPINESS, PLEASURE, AND JUDGMENT: THE CONTEXTUAL THEORY
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attaining goals (so attaining or missing a goal does not, in the long-
run, have as large an impact as commonly assumed);151 (4) people
have a psychological "immune system" that helps them recover from
bad events;152 and (5) people have a basic human need to explain
and make sense of external stimuli (for example, coming to terms
with a death), which reduces the long-term impact of an event by
eventually making it no longer seem extraordinary.'53
Each of the above five theories explains some of the empirical
data, but all except the fifth are incomplete. The first does not
account for why happiness is affected by external events and why
only temporarily; the second does not apply to adaptation to one-
time events; the third does not address negative events; and the
fourth does not address positive events. The fifth theory is the most
satisfactory empirically and has the added feature of understanding
happiness as a trait that varies in response to environmental
demands, but maintains itself within a baseline range, just like
blood pressure, heart rate, and hormone levels.154 Proponents of the
fifth theory summarize it by the acronym AREA: people Attend to
self-relevant but unexplained events, emotionally React to such
events, come to understand or Explain them, and so come to Adapt
in the sense of attending less and experiencing diminishing
emotional reactions.1
55
The fifth theory-that to adapt to loss, people must be able to
make sense of it-implies that those who lose jobs due to discrimi-
nation are less likely to adapt than those who lose jobs for other
reasons. They may understand that discrimination occurs, but that
understanding makes it harder, not easier, to make sense of the
world and of their fate. This interpretation draws support from the
literature on dignitary harms-emotional reactions such as insult,
AND ITS APPLICATIONS (1995).
151. Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being: The Science of Happiness and a Proposal for a
National Index, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 34 (2000).
152. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 621-33 (1998).
153. Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Explaining Away: A Model of Affective
Adaptation, 3 PERSP. PSYCHOL. Sci. 370 (2008).
154. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Making Sense: The Causes of Emotional Evanescence, in 1
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 209 (Isabelle
Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003).
155. Wilson & Gilbert, supra note 153, at 371 fig.1.
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outrages, and resentment from unfair treatment. 5 ' People feel
particularly harmed by discrimination because of the animosity and
hatred it expresses,'57 and the illegitimacy of discrimination makes
the loss harder to make sense of, which in turn magnifies the
dignitary harms and subjective losses from unemployment.158 A
cross-sectional study of over 66,000 people in 66 countries found
that women are more satisfied with their lives today if there was
less discrimination in an economy 20 years ago.' 59
C. How Courts Could, Under Current Law, Compensate
Terminated Employees' Endowment Loss and Happiness Loss
To date, nobody has suggested adjusting employment damages to
account for terminated employees' endowment losses, happiness
losses, or both."'6 As discussed above, given the persuasive evidence
such losses are real, any effort to make a terminated employee's
damages an accurate assessment of the employee's losses should
include these intangible but real losses.
156. See Nicole Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH.
L. REv. 101 (2006).
157. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) (describing theories that evaluate legal
actions by what those actions express, mean, or symbolize).
158. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 22; see also Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective
Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 713, 721-22 (2008) (discussing
dignitary harms).
159. Christian Bjornskov et al., On Gender Inequality and Life Satisfaction: Does
Discrimination Matter? 1 (KOF Swiss Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 07161, 2009).
160. Issacharoff has suggested that endowments in jobs justify greater legal protection for
long-term employees, but what he advocated was not more damages but more legal liability
(that is, deviation from the employment-at-will rule) for opportunistic terminations of late-
career workers. Issacharoff, supra note 61, at 1786 (arguing "for a limited 'penalty default' in
the interpretation of the early-stage contract formation and for an analysis of late-stage
employment relatively untethered to the initial contract formation"). Issacharoff did not
address damages beyond noting "tremendous difficulties in valuing the precise nature of the
loss a long-term employee suffers in cases of opportunistic discharges." Id. at 1805. He
advocated not enhanced damages but making modest damages more available: "A no-fault
severance scheme" similar to those in Europe giving "protection against dismissal after some
arbitrary time, say two years after hiring .... [Termination after that time would yield a
liquidated damages recovery of one month per year." Id. at 1806-07.
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This section offers several ways courts could modify the standard
relief model to consider terminated employees' endowment and
happiness loss. Some (though not all) of the below methods could be
used by district or appellate courts without any changes to statutes
or Supreme Court precedents.
1. Presume Emotional Distress Damages from Unlawful
Termination, Especially for Long-Term Employees-and Make
Such Damages Available for all Employment Claims
Courts could recognize the endowment and happiness loss
resulting from certain terminations as a basis for awarding
emotional distress damages. Specifically, courts could presume,
absent a contrary showing by the defendant, that compensatory
damages for emotional distress are proper when a plaintiff was
terminated and was thereby either rendered unemployed for a
nontrivial duration, or permanently deprived of his or her chosen
field of work (for example, if his or her next job is in a different field
than the one he or she previously had worked and seen as a
"calling").
One limitation on this proposal is that in some circuits, substan-
tial emotional distress damages awards are hard to sustain without
a professional psychiatric diagnosis.'' But various forms of evi-
dence, from professionals and laypersons, could sustain an emo-
tional distress damages award based on the psychological impact of
a termination. Even if a professional diagnosis is the most reliable
way to prove emotional distress, an award can be based on personal
testimony from the employee and her friends and family about the
toll the discrimination took.'62 Similarly, lay testimony could
address the psychological impact of the career harm, such as
whether the plaintiffs life experience supports a claim that the job
was his or her "calling." For example, a pediatrics nurse could show
that her whole background was aimed at a life helping and treating
children.
161. See supra notes 44-45.
162. See supra note 46.
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Expert testimony on the psychological effects of employment also
could satisfy courts' need for evidence of emotional distress. For
example:
" Economists utilizing U.S. General Social Survey data
calculated "that to 'compensate' ... for unemployment
would take a rise in income of - $60,000 per annum.""1 3
" Similarly, economists utilizing regression equations, based
on data on the happiness levels of people who do and do
not suffer various losses, suggest amounts of compensa-
tory damages for wrongful death of a child, parent, or
spouse in tort cases.
16 4
" Other empirical evidence shows that any partial adapta-
tion to unemployment is nonlinear. Most adaptation is in
the first year of unemployment, with later adaptation
coming at a decreasing rate.
165
Based on these research findings, emotional distress damages
should increase with unemployment duration, but at a declining
rate (for example, damages from four years' unemployment should
be greater than, but not double, damages from two years' unemploy-
ment). More generally, adjusting emotional distress damages based
on the impact of job loss is feasible in two key respects. First, courts
already must make discretionary determinations of emotional
distress damages, so this new consideration would not thrust a new,
unfamiliar task upon courts; it simply would add another consider-
ation to an already murky determination.
Second, although there is no current law supporting such awards,
there is no law forbidding them; courts could make such awards
without any statutory amendment or abrogation of Supreme Court
precedent. The statutory provisions authorizing compensatory dam-
ages for emotional distress are sparse, 66 leaving courts the job of
163. Blanchflower & Oswald, supra note 127, at 1373.
164. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Death, Happiness, and the Calculation
of Compensatory Damages, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S217 (2008).
165. See Andrew E. Clark, et al., Is Job Satisfaction U-shaped in Age?, 69 J. OCCUPATIONAL
& ORG. PSYCHOL. 57 (1996) (finding that current unemployment has less negative impact on
mental stress for people with a higher lifetime unemployment rate, defined as the percentage
of time unemployed since entry into the labor force); Yannis Georgellis et al., Adaptation
Towards Reference Values: A NonLinear Perspective, 67 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 768 (2008)
(finding nonlinearity of adjustment dynamics towards reference points in job satisfaction).
166. "Compensatory damages" in Title VII and ADEA cases are defined broadly with a
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developing case law on the propriety and amounts of such awards.
That case law is primarily district court and circuit court precedent;
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on emotional distress damages
is limited to the principle that in civil rights cases, courts cannot
presume such damages appropriate, but instead must base any such
awards on evidence, leaving district and appellate courts to
determine what evidence suffices.167
One final note, but an important one, is that many employment
statutes and common law doctrines draw criticism 6 ' for not
authorizing any emotional distress damages; examples include
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),'69
of terminations interfering with rights to claim health or pension
benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),7 ° and of state whistleblower rights violations. 7' The lack
of emotional distress damages is even more troubling, towards the
goal of having damages match the actionable harm, in termination
lawsuits that constitute the vast majority of employment claims.
Accordingly, this Article's analysis supports existing, and future,
efforts to add emotional distress damages to the full range of
employment rights statutes that aim to provide relief to workers
terminated for unlawful reasons.'72
nonexhaustive list. "[Fluture pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses," 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(3), but not "backpay [or] interest on backpay," which is a separate form of relief. Id.
§ 1981a(b)(2).
167. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (holding that although mental and emotional
distress caused by constitutional rights violations are compensable, damages above nominal
$1 awards require evidence of the presence and extent of such damages).
168. See infra note 172 (discussing the proposed Paycheck Fairness Act).
169. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626 (2006) (limiting relief available for age discrimination claims
to lost pay due, supplemented only by attorney's fees and, for willful violations, liquidated
damages equal to the lost pay); see Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1995) (detailing
relief for ADEA claims).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-54 (1987)
(holding that ERISA preempted state-law claims for punitive and emotional distress damages
unavailable under ERISA).
171. See supra note 36 (noting the remedies under various state whistleblower laws).
172. Most notably, proposed legislation would add punitive damages and compensatory
damages for emotional distress to the remedies for Equal Pay Act pay discrimination claims.
See Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1388, 110th Cong. (2007). The legislation has not passed but
has substantial support, with 254 Congressional cosponsors as of 2008. See U.S. Library of
Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.01338: (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
20091 223
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:183
2. Award More Years of Front Pay for Terminated than
Nonhired Employees
Courts already have wide discretion as to the duration of front
pay awarded (and also as to back pay, when many years pass
between termination and verdict). Those discretionary choices are
rarely reversed under the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard
of review;'73 the few reversals in the case law tend to be of (1)
awards that do not explain the basis for the pay duration chosen,174
(2) awards to plaintiffs who did not mitigate their damages with
reasonable effort to find comparable work,175 and (3) unusually long
(for example, twenty-year) front pay awards compensating young
plaintiffs until retirement age.' 76 A district court that avoids these
pitfalls-by explaining the pay duration, by avoiding awards to
plaintiffs who do not mitigate damages, and by avoiding two-decade
173. See Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2007); Christensen v. Titan Distrib.,
Inc., 481 F.3d 1085, 1098 (8th Cir. 2007).
174.
Because the purpose of front pay is to make each plaintiff whole, the district
court must look at the individualized circumstances .... A flat rule awarding
front pay for a specific period ... would defeat the purpose .... It is unclear here
why the district court thought a two year front pay award would adequately
compensate plaintiffs; the record does not appear to support that assessment.
We do not ... hold that two years is definitely inappropriate in these cases. We
... reverse and remand the front pay award and instruct the district court to
articulate the specific bases for the end date for each plaintiff.
Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1145 (10th Cir. 1999).
175. See, e.g., Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1066 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Sellers had a duty
to mitigate her damages by seeking comparable employment .... [O]n remand, the district
court should determine an amount that Sellers could have earned if she had attempted to find
comparable work, and reduce any award accordingly.) (citations omitted).
176. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Champion Int'l Corp., 81 F.3d 798, 805
(8th Cir. 1996) ("Fiedler was awarded front pay for twenty-four years, until ... retirement age.
An award of front pay until retirement ignores the plaintiffs duty to mitigate damages and
the district court's corresponding obligation to estimate the financial impact of future
mitigation. Instead of warranting a lifetime of front pay, Fiedler's relatively young age should
improve his future opportunities to mitigate through other employment .... [A] number of
cases have rejected far shorter awards as improperly speculative. For these reasons, ... we
express grave doubt that an award of ... [such] front pay could be upheld.") (collecting cases)
(citations omitted).
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awards except in exceptional cases' 77-has great freedom as to front
pay duration. 7 '
Because a district court has such great discretion, subject to
limited review, it could err on the side of a longer front pay period
for plaintiffs who lost more endowment or happiness due to the job
loss or ensuing unemployment. Such a consideration is not classi-
cally part of the front pay analysis, but it is an easy way for a court
to make sure the plaintiffs package of relief covers any endowment
or happiness loss. Given the discretionary nature of a court's choice
of a number of years of pay, there certainly are cases in which a
court's best estimate of the proper duration is not a specific number
(for example, four years) but a range (for example, three to five
years). Rather than arbitrarily choose a number within that range,
a court could choose a higher number for cases of high endowment
or happiness impact (for example, the five-year upper end of a three-
to-five-year range) and a lower number in that range for plaintiffs
lacking such endowment or happiness impact.
177. For a classic example of a justified award of two decades of front pay, see Padilla v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 126 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming award of front pay
for "well over twenty years," until plaintiff reached retirement age at 67, where the job
plaintiff lost was highly specialized and there was little prospect of him finding "substantially
comparable employment"). As the court there explained,
Padilla has only a high school education and his vocational experience has been
confined primarily to serving as a dispatcher and a supervisor of dispatchers in
the railroad industry. Padilla was able to obtain a salary of approximately
$65,800 by developing these unique and narrowly focused skills, and it is very
unlikely that he will be able to find alternative employment at this salary.
Id.
178. There are exceptions, of course, where an appellate panel reverses a front pay award
because it strongly believes the district court got the facts badly wrong. See, e.g., EEOC v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 480 F.3d 724, 732 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Given Barrios's steadily
deteriorating medical condition, however, her doctor's repeated statements as time went on
that she remained unable to work, and the fact that the trial occurred more than three years
after her doctor's first disability determination..., the court's finding that Barrios could work
for nearly ten more years postjudgment defies reality and the record .... [Unable to work in
the future, Barrios was not eligible to receive 'future wages and benefits.' ... [The] frontpay
award must not grant plaintiff a windfall.").
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D. Objections to Compensating Endowment and Happiness Loss,
and Responses to Those Objections
Below are responses to several key objections to compensating
terminated employees' endowment and happiness loss: (1) not all
terminated employees suffer such loss;'79 (2) some nonhired em-
ployees suffer great harm due to ongoing unemployment; 0 (3)
compensating such loss could inhibit labor mobility by encouraging
high subjective values;' 8 ' (4) and increasing termination damages
could be unfair to women and minorities, because it could disin-
centivize hiring members of discriminated-against groups,'82 as well
as (5) because job loss may yield greater damages for men than for
women. 183
1. Which Employees Actually Feel an "Endowment" in Their
Jobs, or Suffer "Happiness" Loss Due to Employment?
How can a court know whether a plaintiff felt an "endowment" in
a job or whether the termination caused a "happiness" loss justify-
ing enhanced damages? Not all employees feel an endowment in
even a long-term job. Many hate their jobs, keeping them only out
of pure economic need; some terminated employees may not be that
unhappy about the job loss, because, for example, they were already
on the fence about whether to keep the job."u Even for employees
who clearly did suffer endowment or happiness loss, uncertainty
remains as to the proper amount of compensation for such a loss,
yielding an "unpredictability" that undercuts the feasibility of
heightened damages based on endowment value.8 5
179. See infra Part I.D.1.
180. See infra Part I.D.2.
181. See infra Part I.D.3.
182. See infra Part I.D.4.
183. See infra Part I.D.5.
184. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 26, 2003, at 42
(offering statistics and examples of how "ambitious, achieving women" with a range of career
options "leave [jobs] more easily and find other parts of life more fulfilling," and that "of the
108 women who have appeared on [a] list of the top 50 most powerful women over the years,
at least 20 have chosen to leave their high-powered jobs, most voluntarily, for lives that are
less intense and more fulfilling").
185. Issacharoff, supra note 61, at 1808. Issacharoff elaborates that heightened damages
would be consequential damages, which would "create confusion ... by making uncertain
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These uncertainties are real but, for several reasons, should not
be exaggerated, and should not prevent courts from undertaking
more accurate damages inquiries by considering endowment and
happiness loss. First, inquiry into employees' subjective job at-
tachment (endowment) and psychological state (happiness loss)
would not threaten to muddy damages proceedings that already
require discretionary, subjective, even arbitrary determinations. As
discussed above, to assess damages, the court must do the following:
(1) The court must choose a duration of front and back
pay based on "guesswork" as to not only what the
plaintiffs job prospects will be in the future, but also
what the plaintiffs job prospects would have been in
a hypothetical world in which he or she was not
terminated.
(2) The court must pick an amount of emotional distress
damages in conformity with a body of precedent that
includes a wide range of awards for similar levels of
harm, and in which essentially the only guiding
principle is that more evidence allows higher dam-
ages.
(3) Finally, the court also has 'latitude" to pick whatever
amount of punitive damages it deems appropriate to
"vindicate the State's legitimate interests in punish-
ment and deterrence, 186 subject only to a statutory
cap and broad Due Process limits.187
In short, adding one more consideration-subjective job attachment
(endowment) and psychological state (happiness loss)-just would
make already-murky damages inquiries more accurate at matching
damages to harm suffered.
Second, current law does not really avoid assessing endowment
and happiness loss. In not awarding damages for the endowment
loss of a long-term job or the happiness loss from unemployment,
valuation of the harms suffered by the employee ... [and] making it difficult to place the
employer fully on notice at the stage of hire." Id. at 1805. This leads Issacharoff to doubt
"whether an employer should be liable for harms suffered outside the normal expectations of
the contractual relationship." Id.
186. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
187. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing limits on the size and permissibility of punitive
damages).
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current law just estimates the harm from those losses as zero,
surely an inaccurate estimate in many cases.
Third, while the damages inquiry this Article proposes would be
subjective, it would not be wholly arbitrary; there are relevant
factors for courts to consider. The following are some of the factors
courts could consider in determining the presence or absence, and
the size, of any endowment or happiness loss:
" The job substance. Does it pay less than others requiring
similar skill or training because it provides "psychological
income"? If so, there more likely is endowment value, in
contrast to more generic or replaceable jobs, as indicated
by studies finding no endowments in goods (for example,
tokens with a cash value) lacking subjective value."s
" Availability of similar employment. Can the plaintiff find
a similar job-or is the plaintiff forced to go into a differ-
ent field of work? Those who find similar work suffer less
endowment loss than those forced to give up fields in
which they worked for years or decades."19
" Length of tenure. Longer-tenured employees are more
likely to feel attachment to a job. Their endowment value
might grow over time. Alternatively, employees who do
not feel attachment to a job are more likely to leave for
another job (or leave the workforce for personal reasons),
a "revealed preferences" argument that on average,
longer-tenured employees have, by staying, indicated they
more likely feel an endowment value than employees new
to a job.190
188. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
189. See Amy Wrzesniewski et al., Jobs, Careers, and Callings: People's Relations to Their
Work, 31 J. RES. PERSONALITY 21 (1997) (finding that people perennially underemployed in
their jobs are likely to experience less fulfillment, meaning, and satisfaction than people who
are not).
190. See Issacharoff, supra note 61, at 1796. Of course, it is only on average, other things
equal, that longer-term employees have more endowment value; other factors that may not
be equal include being a primary or secondary earner, one's family situation, macroeconomic
conditions, labor market conditions, regional economic conditions, and transactions costs of
job search.
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2. Couldn't Nonhired Employees Suffer the Same Happiness
Loss Due to Unemployment as Fired Employees?
Most of the above data on happiness losses due to unemployment
documents not that firing causes unhappiness, but that unemploy-
ment does.' 9' Conceivably, the same happiness loss could result from
unemployment (a) from a failure to hire and (b) from a firing.'92
While true, this observation does not undercut the idea of enhanced
damages for terminations for three reasons.
(1) Even if there may not be a happiness difference
between firing and nonhiring, the endowment distinc-
tion remains. Firings cause endowment loss, but
failures to hire cannot (because an individual cannot
come to feel an "endowment" in a job she never had).
(2) While virtually all terminations leave the worker
unemployed at least briefly (it is the rare employee
who lands a job immediately after being fired), many
failures to hire cause no unemployment (because the
worker already had a job and was just seeking a new
one).
(3) When people suffer failures to hire that leave them
unemployed, it is hard to blame the employer for a
191. But see Sonja C. Kassenboehmer & John P. Haisken-DeNew, You're Fired! The Causal
Negative Effect of Entry Unemployment on Life Satisfaction, 119 ECON. J. 448 (2009)
(examining whether and how these three reasons for unemployment-voluntary, being fired,
and company closing-impacted life satisfaction based upon the German Socio-Economic
Panel from 1991 to 2006); see also Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, Happiness,
Contentment and Other Emotions for Central Banks 31 figs.2A & 2B (Nat1 Bureau Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13622, 2007) (differentiating between changes in life
satisfaction from unexpected unemployment due to plant closing versus expected
unemployment due to retirement); Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCuloch, Happiness for
Central Banks 27 fig.2 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.bos.frb.orgleconomic/conf/Behavioral
Policy2007/papers/DiTella.pdf (same).
192. Happiness surveys can include a question asking respondents to self-report why their
previous employment was terminated from a number of possible listed reasons. While none
of those reasons is discriminatory firing, one reason is being fired. For example, this is true
of both the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSEP). See INST. FOR Soc. & ECON. RESEARCH, BHPS QUESTIONNAIRES AND SURVEY
DOCUMENTS (2008), httpJ/www.iser.essex.ac.uk/surveylbhps/documentation-and-questionn
aireslquestionnaires-and-survey-documents (BHPS questionnaires); DIW BERLIN, GERMAN
Socio-ECONOMIC PANEL QUESTIONNAIRES & FIELDWORK DOCUMENTS (2008), http://www.diw-
berlin.de/sixcmsldetail.php?id=diw_02.c.238114.en (GSEP questionnaires).
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happiness loss that traces to preexisting joblessness;
people unemployed for a long time do not lose much
more happiness loss from continuing that unemploy-
ment. 1
93
Thus, while there surely are some failures to hire that cause as
much happiness loss as certain firings, this Article's point remains:
on average, terminations are more likely to yield happiness loss
than failures to hire are-which justifies presuming greater
damages in termination cases than in hiring cases.
3. Is It Desirable To Compensate Endowment and Happiness
Loss, Even Assuming Those Losses Are Real?
If endowment and happiness loss increase a terminated em-
ployee's damages beyond economic loss, that raises a key question:
if the harm to the victim exceeds the expenditures the breacher
(employer) should have made to the victim (that is, paying the
victim's salary), which is the proper measure of damages? Put in
terms of the broader debate on the endowment effect: if the
willingness-to-accept price ("WTA," the amount the party with the
endowment would require to give it up) exceeds the willingness-to-
pay price ("WTP," the amount the party taking away the entitle-
ment would spend), which is the "right" value-WTA or WTP?
Whether WTP or WTA is the proper measure of damages is a
major debate in many fields, such as eminent domain.'94 In employ-
ment law, the issue is less vexing, because there are strong reasons
for courts to choose WTA over WTP, that is, for damages to compen-
sate full endowment and happiness losses. In employment jurispru-
dence, the rule is "make-whole" relief; harm to the plaintiff is
presumed recoverable even if it requires the defendant to make an
expenditure that, unlike salary, it would not have made if it had
complied with its legal duties.'95 In contrast, in cases of less in-
193. Andrew E. Clark, et al., supra note 165 (finding that current unemployment has less
negative impact on mental stress for people with a higher lifetime unemployment rate,
defined as the percentage of time unemployed since entry into the labor force).
194. See, e.g., Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 22 (arguing that damages for real property
are too low because the endowment effect and subjective valuation mean market value is
insufficient compensation).
195. See supra notes 27-28.
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vidious wrongdoing, courts do not require defendants to pay such
full damages. For example, in eminent domain, the proper measure
of relief is market value without enhanced endowment or sub-
jective value, because government taking of private property is not
a wrong, but a constitutionally authorized government power.
Similarly, contract law "generally does not characterize a party in
breach as a wrongdoer,""19 which is why breacher liability does not
"extend[ ] beyond financial remuneration";'97 breach is compensated
in a limited fashion. A defendant pays only economic losses, not
emotional distress damages, consequential damages beyond those
clearly foreseeable, punitive damages, or attorney's fees, because the
law allows "efficient breaches" that occur when the breaching party
can draw greater value elsewhere, so long as that breaching party
compensates the victim. 9 ' This idea underlies some other nations'
laws on termination, which provide for modest severance pay for a
no-fault termination, but a punitive allowance for more in wrongful
terminations.'"
Also, employment markets are different from markets in which
protecting "endowment value" would troublingly inhibit market
transactions. For example, it could inhibit efficient public projects
to require property taken by eminent domain to be compensated
above market value. No such problem exists in employment ter-
mination cases, because endowment value in jobs seems good, not
bad, to encourage; corporations affirmatively try to establish firm
cultures of optimism because employees who feel positively about
their employer, job, and co-workers accomplish more,200 especially
196. Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1679, 1686 (2008).
197. Id. at 1685.
198. Id. at 1685-86 ('[C]ontract law is not punitive. There may be a moral content to
promises, but this does not imply that a promisor's legal obligation to perform extends beyond
financial remuneration. A promisor who chooses to pay damages rather than to perform may
be seen as behaving badly, and the promisor may be shunned by others in the business
community who expect performance. But ... the law generally will not intercede or condemn
the promisor.").
199. See Issacharoff, supra note 61, at 1809 (documenting such laws in European nations).
200.
[Tihe most successful person, on average, tends not to be the realist, but rather
the optimist. High levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy are associated with
aggressiveness, perseverance, and optimal risk-taking. These biases may be
particularly adaptive in business settings, where decisiveness and aggres-
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with the decline of the career-wage model of lifetime employment
that once aligned employer and employee interests.
20 1
4. Would Increasing Termination Damages Increase Hiring
Discrimination?
Increasing the damages for some termination cases beyond those
for hiring cases implicates a long-discussed problem in employment
law. Already, failure-to-hire claims are far more rare than those by
incumbent employees, such as termination, harassment, and
accommodation claims. °2 This gap exists partly because of the infor-
mation difference between, for example, terminated and nonhired
workers. Once the discrimination laws eliminated the most obvious
discrimination decades ago, discriminatory motivations became
hidden, and whereas terminated employees may know much about
the termination decisions (their performance evaluations, "dirt" on
the decision makers, and so on), nonhired applicants often know no
reasons for the rejections (because they typically never spent any
time in the workplace, often never even having any communications
with the decision makers other than the application and the
rejection).2"3
With hiring discrimination all but unactionable but termination
decisions risking lawsuits, conceivably an employer could use hiring
siveness are considered indicators of a successful manager .... Mhey also
influence others; exhibitions of confidence and optimism make people more
persuasive and influential.... [O]ptimistic culture ... is an ideal motivator,
creating the expectation of future growth and profitability that leads individuals
to invest their human capital in the firm ... and to defer present consumption in
favor of future rewards. Firms with "can-do" cultures will thereby generate
higher levels of internal effort and ... be more successful in attracting external
resources. Conversely, an optimistic culture can blind managers to the kind of
anxiety ... that might otherwise trigger ... selfish "last period" kind of behavior.
Donald Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead
Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 153-55
(1997).
201. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993) (noting the decline of the career-wage model).
202. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1024-25 (1991).
203. See Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with
Disturbing Implications for Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law,
27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 17-19 (2004).
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discrimination to decrease lawsuit risk: avoid hiring groups most
likely to have employment claims. The employment-at-will doctrine
prevents most employees from challenging an employment deci-
sion for mere inaccuracy or unfairness, so those most likely to have
hiring claims may be those in the discrimination statutes' "protected
classes"-women, racial minorities, the elderly, and workers with
disabilities. °4
Yet this fear-that incentivizing lawsuits increases hiring dis-
crimination-may be illusory for two reasons. First, many employ-
ment discrimination claims are brought by middle-aged white men
who fit into the "protected classes" of, for example, the age discrimi-
nation laws, which require only that the worker be forty years old.2"5
Moreover, because late-career workers average higher salaries, the
most costly discrimination claimants are terminated late-middle-
aged workers with age claims.20 6 Thus, it is doubtful that employers
could avoid employment claims with hiring discrimination against
under-represented groups.
Second, most employment cases lose on pretrial dispositive
motions,20 7 and those that survive typically yield only modest
payouts to employees,208 so it is hard to depict them as a significant
204. See id. (noting this argument).
205. See Joanna Lahey, State Age Protection Laws and The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 51 J.L. & ECON. 433, 438 (2008) (noting that "[tihe majority of people who
sue under the ADEA are white male middle managers or professionals over the age of 50").
206. See supra note 61.
207. Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. PoLy J.
547, 547-48 (2003) ("Employment-discrimination plaintiffs swim against the tide. Compared
to the typical plaintiff, they win a lower proportion of cases during pretrial and after trial.
Then, many of their successful cases are appealed. On appeal, they have a harder time in
upholding their successes, as well in reversing adverse outcomes."); Michael Selmi, Why Are
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557 (2001) ('There
is it seems a general consensus that employment discrimination cases are ... too easy to win
.... [W]hile there are large numbers of employment discrimination suits ... these suits are far
too difficult, rather than easy, to win.").
208. See Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 111 (2007) (noting that most
employment lawsuits end in confidential settlements, and that the one data set on
confidential settlement amounts (collected anonymously in one judicial district) found that:
(1) the median confidential settlement in an employment discrimination case was $30,000;
(2) the median in personal injury lawsuits was $181,500; and (3) of the 455 discrimination
settlements (the largest group studied), only 9 (just under 2 percent) were above $300,000,
and only 1 (0.2 percent) was above $1 million).
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aspect of labor cost. It seems unlikely that an infrequent five-figure
cost would induce illegal hiring practices, especially with any gap
between the cost of termination and of hiring claims likely only a
small fraction of average cost per suit. Thus, a modest increase in
damages in only some termination claims is unlikely to induce
hiring discrimination.
5. Would Compensating Endowment Value Favor Men over
Women, and White-Collar over Blue-Collar Workers?
Men may be likely to draw from their job the sense of self-worth
that could be a source of endowment value.2 °9 Further, male-
dominated, higher-paid, and white-collar jobs may be more likely to
yield personal fulfillment than many blue-collar jobs typically held
only for the paycheck. Also, to the extent women more often take
time off from their careers for family reasons, fewer women may
have employment relationships as long-term as those of their male
counterparts. If endowment value is higher on average for men
and white-collar workers, compensating endowment value might
increase average damages for those relatively more privileged
workers. This is troubling, but the opposite may be true. Women,
not men, may have higher endowment values, and even if men's
endowment values are higher, that is an indictment of the current
state of the American workplace, not of this Article's damages
proposal, and it should not stand in the way of more accurate
damages determinations.
First, women, not men, may have higher endowment values,
because women report higher than men on eight measures of job
satisfaction, even controlling for many individual and job character-
istics. 2 0 This gender difference in reported job satisfaction exists
despite women earning significantly less for the same job than
equivalently qualified men.2 1' Further, even if more men than
209. See Issacharoff, supra note 61, at 1803 (noting "the social connections that arise from
the workplace-the sense of status and self-worth-and the inevitable source of identity in
a society in which the premier social gathering icebreaker is still, 'what do you do for a
living?"').
210. Andrew E. Clark, Job Satisfaction and Gender: Why Are Women So Happy at Work?,
4 LABOUR ECON. 341 (1997).
211. Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers III, How Does Gender Play a Role in the
Earnings Gap? An Update, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2003, at 9. Social norms concerning the
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women feel career attachment,212 that is changing; it is less true
now than a generation ago, and it likely will be even less true a
generation from now.213
Still, it is conceivable that men have higher endowment values,
just as white men now are more likely (due to the glass ceiling and
related phenomena) to draw higher salaries (which would mean
more economic damages from a termination).2"4 These inequalities
are real, reflecting a complex mix of discrimination, educational and
human capital inequities, and inertia from past discrimination. Yet
it is hard to see why refraining from making emotional distress
damages more accurate would be a good response to those dispari-
ties; it does not improve disadvantaged workers' situation in society
to retain the currently inadequate methods of calculating damages
for the small fraction of workers who suffer discrimination. In short,
if there is a gender social difference as to work attachment to work
by gender, that is a broader social problem that cannot be redressed
by pretending, in damages calculations, it does not exist.
II. RECOGNIZING THE REALITIES OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE DUTIES:
WHEN REASONABLE EMPLOYEES MIGHT NOT REPORT DISCRIMINATION;
WHEN EMPLOYER ANTIBIAS PROGRAMS ARE (NOT) EFFECTIVE
Proving discrimination often is not the end of a discrimination
case. Even after a plaintiff proves discrimination, retaliation, or
harassment," employers have powerful affirmative defenses-to all
appropriate relative pay of women compared to men may explain gender differences in well-
being. Rafael Lalive & Alois Stutzer, Approval of Equal Rights and Gender Differences in
Well-Being, J. POPULATION ECON. (forthcoming).
212. See Belkin, supra note 184.
213. See generally RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS
tbl. 6.1 (8th ed. 2003) (indicating that women's labor force participation was barely 20 percent
through 1950 but rose to 37.7 percent in 1960, 43.3 percent in 1970, 51.5 percent in 1980, 57.5
percent in 1990, and 60.0 percent in 2000).
214. See id. at 379 (noting that women earned, on average, 59 percent what men earned
in 1980, and that percentage rose only to 65 percent by 2000).
215. Technically, harassment is just discrimination as to "terms and conditions" of
employment that takes the form of a "hostile work environment" rather than inequity in pay,
hiring, firing, etc. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
Although "sexual harassment" doctrine is the best-known, the discrimination laws ban hostile
work environments based on any forbidden ground, whether race, age, disability, or
retaliation. See, e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436, 446 (2d
Cir. 1999) (recognizing claims of"racial harassment" and "retaliatory co-worker harassment");
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liability in harassment cases, 216 and to punitive damages in all
discrimination or harassment cases 217 -based on employer effort to
prevent and redress workplace violations. In harassment cases, the
employer defense also has a requirement for employees: harassment
victims must, before suing, complain internally, typically to a
supervisor or to a human resources official, as required by the
employer's policies and procedures.
Courts tend to apply these employer and employee requirements
fairly formalistically, with little willingness to recognize exceptions.
Employees rarely prevail in claiming justification for not reporting
harassment internally.218 Similarly, most courts deem any facially
plausible antidiscrimination policy sufficient, despite criticism of
many programs as ineffectual or fraudulent.219
Behavioral and happiness research findings provide support for
criticisms of this jurisprudence as too formalistic and too unwilling
to recognize exceptions. As subpart (A) discusses, a rational em-
ployee's fear of retaliation might make him or her reluctant to
report harassment, a fear that may be increased by various docu-
mented behavioral economics phenomena, specifically prospect
theory (fear of upsetting even an unpleasant status quo), endow-
ment effect (fearing retaliation more than standard economic
"rationality" would predict), and the salience and availability biases
(fearing, in an atmosphere of uncertainty, more retaliation than
may be likely). As subpart (B) discusses, employer antidiscrim-
ination programs likely are most effective when focused on the
positive (because people think and problem solve best in positive
emotional states) rather than on the negative (such as by stressing
that discrimination yields lawsuits and disharmony), a distinction
that could help inform courts' thus-far inadequate efforts to
separate effective from ineffective employer programs.
Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (same as to
retaliatory harassment).
216. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998).
217. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
218. See infra Part III.A.
219. See infra Part III.B.
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A. Employee Duty To Report Harassment Internally: Too Little
Recognition of Reasonable Reluctance To Complain
1. Courts' Strict Rule, Almost Without Exceptions, that
Employees Must Report Harassment Internally
Key to whether an employer is liable for workplace harassment
is whether the employer had notice (actual or constructive) of that
harassment. Only if the harassment culminated in a tangible
employment action (for example, termination or demotion) is the
employer automatically liable.22° Otherwise, an employer is liable
for harassment by the victim's co-worker (as opposed to supervisor)
only if the employer negligently failed to take appropriate action to
remedy harassment it knew (or reasonably should have known)
occurred.221 A supervisor's harassment of a subordinate yields
vicarious liability more automatically than co-worker harassment,
but the employer can defeat liability with an affirmative defense
established by two companion Supreme Court cases, Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton222 and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth.223 The
Faragher/Ellerth defense to vicarious harassment liability has two
parts-an employer duty to prevent, and an employee duty to
report. An employer is liable for a supervisor's harassment unless
it proves both "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advan-
tage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 224
220. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 137 (2004) ("[A]n employer is strictly liable
for supervisor harassment that 'culminates in a tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment."') (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765).
221. Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir.. 1999) ("An employer may
be held liable for the harassment of one employee by a fellow employee (a nonsupervisor) if
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to implement prompt
and appropriate corrective action."); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d
426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[An employer will be liable in negligence for a racially or sexually
hostile work environment created by a victim's co-workers if the employer knows about (or
reasonably should know about) that harassment but fails to take appropriately remedial
action." (citing Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267)).
222. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
223. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
224. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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The second part of the Faragher/Ellerth defense is written in
general terms. Most courts interpret it as requiring employees to
report harassment internally to the employer before suing,22 5 based
on this Faragher/Ellerth language:
While proof that an employee failed to fulfill the ... obligation of
reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by
the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally
suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second
element of the [affirmative) defense.22
If an employee failed to report harassment internally to the
employer, that alone usually lets the employer prevail in arguing
that the employee failed her Faragher/Ellerth duty. There are not
many situations when a court will excuse an employee from failing
to report. Courts are unsympathetic to employee arguments that
they declined to report for fear of retaliation, absent actual, specific
evidence retaliation is likely.227 The threshold for evidence of
retaliation sufficient to justify nonreporting is high; it is insufficient
for an employee to argue that retaliation (or not being taken
seriously) was likely because the harasser is a friend of key
company officials.228 For retaliation fear to be sufficiently "credible,"
the employee must have actual evidence "the employer has ignored
or resisted similar complaints or has taken adverse actions against
employees in response to such complaints." '229 Further, for an
employee's fear of retaliation to excuse a failure to complain, it must
225. For co-worker harassment (rather than the supervisory harassment that Faragher and
Ellerth address directly), employee reporting of the harassment is all the more likely to be
dispositive, because the negligence standard applicable to co-worker claims is all the more
dispositively focused on employer knowledge of the harassment. "[A]n employer will be liable
in negligence for a racially or sexually hostile work environment created by a victim's co-
workers if the employer knows about (or reasonably should know about) that harassment but
fails to take appropriately remedial action." Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446; see Curry, 195 F.3d
at 660 (holding same).
226. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
227. See Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001); Shaw
v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999); Gonzalez v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 262
F. Supp. 2d 342, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
228. See Barrett, 240 F.3d at 267; Gonzalez, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
229. Leopold v. Baccarat, 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001); see Walton v. Johnson &
Johnson Servs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).
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be a credible fear of what the employer might do, not just what a co-
worker might do.23°
Absent a specific threat of retaliation, the fact that an employee
failed to complain internally suffices for an employer to "carry[] its
ultimate burden of persuasion" that an employee unreasonably
failed to report.231 Employees rarely are excused from the duty to
complain; it is not enough that the employee (1) was uncomfortable
reporting details of sexual harassment to the employer,232 (2)
wanted to give the harasser time (or a chance to stop) before being
terminated,233 or (3) wanted to wait to determine whether the
harasser was a "predator" or simply an "interested man. 2 34 Finally,
the employee must not only report the harassment to the employer,
but do so promptly, with a delay of even several months often
leading courts to find that the employee failed the duty to report.235
Of course, with no subsequent Supreme Court cases addressing
Faragher/Ellerth employee and employer duties, some courts are
more forgiving of employees, but the point remains: most courts
interpret Faragher and Ellerth as imposing an employee duty to
complain internally about harassment, to do so promptly, and to do
so in all cases lacking a highly specific threat of retaliation.
230. See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999).
231. Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (holding that plaintiff
acted unreasonably in not reporting, where she lacked evidence of other employees suffering
retaliation).
232. See Williams v. Dep't of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
employee argument that "shame, shock and humiliation" explained failure to report
harassment); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003); Barrett, 240 F.3d at
268; Shaw, 180 F.3d at 813.
233. See Leugers v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Servs., 205 F.3d 1340 (6th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision).
234. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2001).
235. See An v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 01-2223, 2004 WL 188192, at *6 (10th Cir. Feb.
2, 2004) (deeming a delay of reporting of nine months to be too long); Walton v. Johnson &
Johnson Servs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (same, two and one half months); Hardy
v. Univ. of Ill., 328 F.3d 361, 365-66 (7th Cir. 2003) (deeming six-week delay not too long);
Gawley v. Indiana Univ., 276 F.3d 301, 312 (7th Cir. 2001) (same, seven months). See
generally Loretta T. Attardo, Practice Pointers on Opposing The Affirmative Defense
Established By Ellerth and Faragher, 656 PLI/Lit 339, 343 (2001) (arguing that an employee
should not be expected to report after the first or second incident of "relatively minor
harassment").
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2. Critiquing the Strict Requirement of Internal Reporting:
Rational Employee Fear, Heightened by Cognitive Biases and
Psychological Barriers
The strictness of the employee reporting requirement has drawn
substantial scholarly criticism.2 3' To begin with, internal com-
plaints are aberrational, not common; workplace studies showed
that historically, only 2 to 13 percent of harassment victims actually
have complained to their employers.2 37 Thus, "[the] requirement
placed on employees to report harassment through their employer's
internal grievance procedures ... is at odds with the way employees
actually behave and respond to harassment. 238 Moreover, reluc-
tance to report harassment is quite understandable, given the real
risk of retaliation,239 the more informal or personal alternatives
many women choose over formal measures like filing official
complaints,24 ° and the power imbalance harassment victims may
feel due to economic vulnerability or workplace underrepre-
sentation.24' Consequently, some argue that "the mandatory re-
porting requirement actually enables workplace harassment by
allowing employers to escape responsibility even when a victim has
legitimate reasons for not using official procedures. 242
236. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Title VI's Midlife Crisis: The Case of Constructive
Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 311-14 (2004); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 671-77 (2000); L. Camille
Hebert, Why Don't "Reasonable Women" Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J.
711, 721-29 (2007); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and
Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 197-99 (2004); John H. Marks,
Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of Vicarious'Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious
Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor For Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile
Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. REv. 1401, 1405-07 (2002); Edward A.
Marshall, Excluding Participation in Internal Complaint Mechanisms From Absolute
Retaliation Protection: Why Everyone, Including the Employer, Loses, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL YJ. 549 (2001).
237. Chamallas, supra note 236, at 374 (collecting studies); Lawton, supra note 236, at 208-
09 (collecting studies).
238. Chamallas, supra note 236, at 313.
239. Id. at 376-77; Lawton, supra note 236, at 243, 259-60; Marshall, supra note 236, at
578-79.
240. Chamallas, supra note 236, at 376-77; Marks, supra note 236, at 1451-52.
241. Grossman, supra note 236, at 724-28.
242. Stephen F. Befort & Sarah J. Gorajski, When Quitting Is Fitting- The Need For a
Reformulated Sexual Harassment/Constructive Discharge Standard in the Wake of
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 633 (2006) (citing Lawton, supra
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Behavioral research supports these critiques by noting why
employees may rationally, or at least unavoidably (and thus
"reasonably"), not report harassment. If employees have an
endowment effect in their jobs, as discussed above,24 they will
especially fear retaliatory firing because they will hesitate to upset
even the unpleasant status quo of having a job but facing harass-
ment. If prospect theory accurately describes people's job prefer-
ences, then the risk of loss (retaliation) is more fearsome than the
risk of gain (stopping the harassment) is appealing. Even if endow-
ment effects and related job valuation phenomena are uncertain,
other behavioral research finds people prone to the availability
heuristic244 and salience bias.245 Everyone remembers and spreads
rumors about instances of retaliation,246 but not about uneventful
complaints, so that employees may perceive exaggerated, unrealistic
probabilities of retaliation. Retaliation is a real phenomenon, 247 but
retaliatory motive usually is concealed, so the probability is
uncertain, leaving room for the influence of cognitive perceptual
biases.
Learned helplessness, a psychological condition in which the
lesson people draw from a harmful situation is that changing the
situation is beyond their control, is another reason reasonable
employees may not report harassment. Psychologist Martin
Seligman and his colleagues first accidentally discovered that dogs
can be experimentally conditioned to exhibit learned helplessness,
248
and then extended these findings to humans;249 other psychologists
have since further recognized and applied learned helplessness
note 236, at 199).
243. See supra Part I (discussing employees' endowment value in their jobs, in the context
of assessing damages from termination).
244. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207-09 (1973).
245. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192-94 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982).
246. See generally NICHOLAS DIFONZO, THE WATERCOOLER EFFECT: A PSYCHOLOGIST
EXPLORES THE EXTRAORDINARY POWER OF RUMORS 13-36 (2008).
247. See supra note 239.
248. Martin E. P. Seligman & Stephen F. Maier, Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock, 74
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1-2 (1967).
249. Donald S. Hiroto & Martin E. P. Seligman, Generality of Learned Helplessness in Man,
31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 311-13 (1975).
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theory.2 ° Learned helplessness can result from workplace harass-
ment if employees are subjected to a pattern of repeated harassment
over which they have no control, leading them to react passively and
form cognitive beliefs that change is not possible.
Thus, the declaration in the Faragher/Ellerth jurisprudence that
a "reasonable" harassed employee always can complain internally
is at odds with the reality that most employees' cognition and cost-
benefit estimates lead them not to complain. The Faragher/Ellerth
complaint requirement essentially gives most employers automati-
cally one of the two elements of the harassment defense in that the
internal complaint requirement makes an unrealistic demand of
employees. "If well-intentioned, thoughtful employees fall prey to
procedural hurdles they cannot be expected to intuit or discover,
then meritorious claims are being dismissed without purpose, i.e.,
without effectively incentivizing employees to engage in the
preferred behavior."25' Even if employees can "intuit or discover" the
complaint requirement, that requirement still demands of employ-
ees something unrealistic and, as discussed below, undesirable.
3. The Prescription: Eliminate the Faragher/Ellerth Employee
Complaint Requirement, or At Least More Broadly Recognize
Exceptions to the Requirement
The above critique of the Faragher/Ellerth employee complaint
requirement duty leads to two proposed reforms. First, the
Faragher/Ellerth employee complaint requirement should be
eliminated, which would make employers strictly liable for work-
place harassment, just as they are strictly liable for various harms
that occur on their premises. Whether employers are liable for
harassment only when negligent, or under a strict liability rule, was
a raging debate before Faragher/Ellerth declared a rule of strict
liability with a negligence-based defense. '52 Changing that rule
250. CHRISTOPHER PETERSON ET AL., LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A THEORY FOR THE AGE OF
PERSONAL CONTROL 3-16, 98-140 (1993) (including chapters by many widely recognized
psychologists summarizing and integrating the application, research, and theory of learned
helplessness).
251. Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two
Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1004 (2007).
252. Shortly before Faragher/Ellerth, "[alt least six different standards [we]re currently
in use in the various courts of appeals, ranging from what is, in effect, strict liability to the
[Vol. 51:183242
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would require a Supreme Court decision or a statutory rewrite of
the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Both are unlikely in the short term,
but Title VII is one statute Congress frequently considers amending
(and occasionally actually amends) to respond to Supreme Court
decisions that (like Faragher/Ellerth) restrict Title VII liability by
expanding employers' defenses.253
Second, district and appellate courts could, within the confines of
existing law, be more willing to recognize circumstances in which an
employee might not have complained internally of harassment but
might still be deemed in compliance with the textual demand of
Faragher/Ellerth-that he employee cannot have "unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."2 4 Many
employment law scholars have argued, though usually not based
on social science findings, that courts should be "[i]nfusing more
less strict 'knew or should have known' standard." Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L.
Henderson, Employer Liability for "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment Created
by Supervisors: The Search for an Appropriate Standard, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 667, 670 (1995)
(citations omitted).
For academic and judicial support of strict liability, see, for example, David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual
Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 71 (1995) ("criticiz[ing]
the courts' failure to uniformly impose vicarious liability on employers in cases involving
sexual harassment by supervisors, and ... the confusing rules applied by the federal courts");
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (adopting strict liability because "[a]n
employer's delegation of [workplace authority] vests in the supervisor such extreme power
over the victimized employee that the supervisor's stature as an 'agent' of the employer cannot
be doubted").
For academic and judicial opposition to strict liability, see, for example, Stacey Dansky,
Eliminating Strict Employer Liability in Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Cases, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 435, 437 (1997) (criticizing strict liability); Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d
490, 517 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Coffey, J., concurring as to the negligence rule, calling
strict liability "guilt by association") (citations omitted).
253. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)) (reversing the interpretation of Title VII the Supreme Court
stated in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that pregnancy discrimination
was not sex discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(narrowing two employer defenses: disparate impact liability under Wards Cove v. Antonio
Packing Co., 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and liability in mixed-motive cases (in which both
discrimination and an unbiased rationale motivated the employer's action against the
plaintiff) under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (reversing the decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), that declared a broader employer affirmative defense
to pay discrimination cases than most circuits had applied).
254. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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leniency into the Faragher/Ellerth reporting requirement., 255 This
Article provides social scientific support for that view and points to
factors that could help determine the reasonableness of not
complaining internally due to fear of retaliation, such as (1) job
security (employees who can be fired only for cause, such as certain
civil servants or professors, would have less fear than those
employed at-will), (2) minority status (not whether the harassed
employee is a member of a minority group, but whether he or she is
essentially alone on the job, such as the only woman at that
workplace), and (3) economic vulnerability (whether job loss would
deprive the employee of essentials of life such as ability to pay for
food, housing, or family needs).
4. Objections to More Judicial Recognition of the
Reasonableness of Employees Not Reporting Harassment and
Responses to Those Objections
There are two important objections to the idea that courts should
be more willing to recognize the reasonableness of an employee
deciding not to report harassment: failing to report is based on
exaggerated fears the law should not accept and reporting harass-
ment helps others, so courts should increase such reporting by
making it a requirement.
a. Failing To Report Harassment Is Based on Irrationally
Exaggerated Fear
Unwillingness to report harassment for fear of retaliation is
irrational, and therefore should not be judicially approved as
"reasonable" behavior, if-as suggested above-that unwillingness
traces to a perception of the odds of retaliation that is exaggerated
due to cognitive biases. Requirements of reasonableness should
assume rational behavior even-perhaps especially-when rational
behavior is not the norm, so as to encourage that rational behavior.
In short, if the law requires internal complaints by harassed
employees who wish to sue but are unduly fearful of complaining,
255. Moss, Fighting Discrimination, supra note 251, at 1009; see supra note 236 (collecting
citations).
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then the law is incentivizing more rational behavior by requiring
those internal complaints.
Yet the idea that employees hesitate to complain due to cognitive
bias should not be exaggerated. Even without biases, it can be quite
rational for an employee in a vulnerable position, or who has reason
to think the company knows and is tolerant of on-premises harass-
ment, to refrain from filing an internal complaint that has a low
probability of success yet risks retaliation that, given the monetary
and psychological costs of unemployment,2"6 can have a catastrophic
impact.
b. Reporting Harassment Benefits Others and Should Be
Encouraged
Even if an employee might be reluctant to complain, Title VII
seeks to redress social problems of bias beyond just that one
employee's complaint, as Congress noted in enacting Title VII.257
Reporting harassment benefits others, at least in instances when
the report does remedy or lessen harassment at that workplace, in
two ways: (1) a complaint that generates a productive employer
response benefits current and potential future victims of the same
harasser, or of other harassers who get away with it due to the same
lax company culture; and (2) a successfully resolved internal
complaint obviates the need for litigation, which saves public
judicial resources. Reporting harassment thus is a "public good" in
economic terms; it benefits others who bear no cost or risk for
receiving that benefit. 258 Public goods tend to be under-provided, so
256. See supra Part I.C.1.
257. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968) (holding award of attorney's
fees presumptively appropriate for prevailing Title VII plaintiffs). As the court explained,
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement
would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law.... When a
plaintiff brings an action ... he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general," vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority.
Id. (citing legislative history).
258. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs 593 (5th ed. 2000).
Technically, reporting harassment is only partially a public good, because sometimes there
are no, or not many, broader benefits, or sometimes the confidential nature of the complaint
process assures limited third-party benefit. The basic point, however, remains: many
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even if it is rational for harassment victims to hesitate to complain
internally, perhaps courts should require them to provide the under-
provided public good of reporting harassment, and thereby try to
have the company resolve the problem itself.
Drafting employees into providing public goods has some logic,
but defies the Title VII statutory purpose of redressing discrimina-
tion by public legal means. Even before litigation commences in
publicly accessible courts, all employment discrimination cases must
begin with the filing of a charge of discrimination at a local office of
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In
contrast, most internally resolved matters yield confidential
settlements, 259 so internal complaints less often yield third-party
antiharassment benefits than public legal complaints of discrimina-
tion.
Further, the assumption of a complaint requirement appears to
be that the victim is the lowest-cost avoider because she knows most
about the harassment. Yet that may not be true; while companies
have limited ability to monitor off-premises injuries (for example,
customers' off-label uses of products), as employers they can monitor
the workplace (easily if a small workplace, or if a large workplace
then through the human resources department). Employers thus
may have reasonably good monitoring ability, without facing the
risk from addressing harassment itself that victims face from
reporting that harassment.
B. Employers'Antidiscrimination and Antiharassment Duties
1. The Sufficiency of Formalities, and the Lack of Close Factual
Scrutiny
Many have argued that while some employer antidiscrimination/
harassment programs can be effective, others are well-intended yet
ineffectual, and still others are disingenuous window dressing by
harassment reports help improve the workplace for the benefit of others, yet the worker who
reports bears the entire risk of ostracism or retaliation, so there may be fewer internal reports
than would be optimal.
259. See Minna Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927,
929 (2006). See generally Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of
Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REv. 867 (2007).
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employers intent on perpetuating or ignoring discrimination.26 ° The
problem, these critics say, is that courts look only to formalities, not
substance, in evaluating employers' programs. Although technically
distinct, "in practice" there is substantial overlap between what does
and does not suffice for the Faragher/Ellerth defense to harassment
liability (based on an effective antiharassment program) and the
Kolstad defense to punitive damages (based on good faith Title VII
compliance). 261
As to employers' defense to punitive damages based on "good faith
efforts to comply with Title VII" under Kolstad v. American Dental
Association62 : in Cooke v. Stefani Management Services,263 the
employer's efforts sufficed, the Seventh Circuit held, when the
employer promulgated a sexual harassment policy, mounted an
antiharassment poster in the work area, and held a seminar on
sexual harassment for managers.2" Many courts have held similarly
that these are the basic, and usually sufficient, elements of an em-
ployer antidiscrimination program,"' even where-as in Cooke-
260. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 959, 961-71 (1999); Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 CoLUm.
L. REV. 458, 490, 537-38 (2001) (noting "risk that employers will adopt legalistic, sham, or
symbolic internal processes that leave underlying patterns of bias unchanged," and that
"[s]ome courts have deferred to an employer's procedures, regardless of their actual
effectiveness .... [This] uncritical acceptance of internal dispute resolution processes
legitimates purely formalistic solutions").
Bisom-Rapp recounted "how defense lawyers attempt to strategically position employers
to safeguard these clients against discrimination and other employment-related litigation,"
Bisom-Rapp, supra at 961, and that "[e]mployers frequently demonstrate fidelity to EEO law
through symbolic rather than substantive actions," id. at 963. Her article presented a "content
analysis of the defense literature advocating preventative practices" showing that
employment defense attorneys often "creat[e] the appearance of nondiscriminatory decision
making without an equivalent emphasis on facilitating substantive change." Id. at 965-66. For
example, "[m]any of the internal dispute resolution mechanisms developed by employers ...
consist of boilerplate from the most recent decisions of the court or the reproduction of EEOC
guidelines." Sturm, supra at 543.
261. Bettina B. Plevan, Training and Other Techniques To Address Complaints of
Harassment, 682 PLI/LIT 675, 755 (2002) ("In theory, failure to establish a Faragher defense
should not necessarily defeat the ability to prove a Kolstad defense. In practice, however, that
is not always the case.").
262. 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
263. 250 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2001).
264. Id. at 568-69.
265. Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548-49 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding
sufficient that employer created "an organization-wide Equal Employment Opportunity
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there was evidence calling the merits of the program into question.
Specifically, in Cooke, the policy requiring employees to report
harassment internally lacked a "bypass" provision allowing em-
ployees to make the report to someone other than the employee's
manger or general manager in the event that one of those managers
was the alleged wrongdoer.266 Many have argued that "bypass"
provisions are critical to having a truly effective employer antidis-
crimination program,217 yet the Cooke court still approved of the
employer's program, asserting that "common sense" would lead a
reasonable person to know she could report to someone other than
her manager.268
Courts only reject employer antidiscrimination programs under
Kolstad (a) when the program is obviously too cursory (for example,
merely posting a federal government poster regarding discrimina-
tion is not a sufficient "good faith" compliance effort,269 and neither
is merely encouraging employees to report grievances to manage-
ment without any further Title VII efforts)27 or, more commonly, (b)
when there is actual evidence the employer did not truly implement,
or failed to comply with, its own policy.271 As to (b), the level of
Policy" barring discrimination, a grievance policy encouraging victims of discrimination or
harassment to complain to the employer, a diversity training program with formal classes and
group exercises for employees, and a record of employee demographics); Hatley v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding an employer liable for harassment despite
having an antiharassment policy, employee harassment training, and an internal procedure
for receiving and investigating complaints); Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 301 F.3d 1204,
1209 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that basic requirements include that the employer created a
policy and made a good faith effort to disseminate that policy as well as to educate its
employees on the policy and on Title VII prohibitions in general).
266. 250 F.3d at 569.
267. Plevan, supra note 261, at 754 (noting that harassment policy should have multiple
reporting channels); Outten et al., supra note 17, at 203-04 (same).
268. 250 F.3d at 569.
269. See, e.g., Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d 452, 460-61 (4th Cir. 2002).
270. See, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir.
1999).
271. See, e.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2000)
(denying employer judgment as a matter of law even though it had a facially plausible
program). The Lowery antiharassment policy had multiple complaint channels, an open-door
grievance policy, mandatory training and meetings with human resources, and
antidiscrimination posters--but top executives exhibited animus toward African Americans
(one buried studies showing reflected racial bias at the workplace) and "several African
American employees ... felt intimidated ... in response to their complaints to management
about racial animus in promotion[s]." Id.; see Hertzberg v. SRAM Corp., 261 F.3d 651,663-64
(7th Cir. 2001) (denying employer motion judgment as a matter of law, when employer had
248
2009] NEW ECONOMICS 249
evidence courts may require to reject a facially plausible antidis-
crimination program, is that the employer's failure to comply with
or truly implement its program is bad enough to allow an inference
that the program is merely "an effort to mask" discrimination, at
least tolerance of discrimination.272
Compared to the Kolstad defense, the Faragher/Ellerth defense
requires a bit less; it more narrowly focuses on "reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior. 273
Yet most courts deem any antiharassment policy with a complaint
procedure sufficient, at least absent specific evidence undercutting
the policy. '"[D]istribution of a valid anti-harassment policy provides
compelling proof that [an employer] exercised reasonable care in
preventing and promptly correcting sexual harassment,"' various
circuits hold. 4
"zero tolerance" policy yet did not make the policy readily available to employees and failed
to respond properly to plaintiffs harassment complaint-officials failed to follow procedures
requiring putting complaints into writing and told plaintiff she was being "too emotional");
Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (denying employer motion
judgment as a matter of law, given lack of training, manager ignorance, and nonresponse to
plaintiffs complaint: "evidence ... undermin[ed] Pacesetter's claim that it made good faith
efforts to educate employees about sexual harassment.... [A] manager ... testified that no such
... training sessions occurred.... [Slubstantial evidence suggestfed] that Pacesetter knew about
Bauersfeld's sexually harassing conduct but failed to take any action .... [Plaintiffs manager]
conceded that ... she believed that a male supervisor would not commit sexual harassment if
he either exposed his genitalia to a female subordinate or grabbed her breasts, so long as he
apologized after the incident."); Ciesielski v. Hooters Mgmt. Corp., No. 03-C-1175, 2004 WL
2997648, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2004) ("[A] reasonable jury could have found that Hooters
had a formal anti-discrimination policy.... [However,] after complaints were made about the
recurring holes in the changing room walls, Hooters' management did not respond in a timely
fashion.").
272. Lowery, 206 F.3d at 446.
273. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
274. See Adams v. O'Reilly Auto., Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted);
see also White v. BFI Waste Servs., 375 F.3d 288, 299 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[D]istribution by an
employer of an anti-harassment policy provides 'compelling proof ... [of] reasonable care in
preventing and promptly correcting harassment."') (citation omitted); Walton v. Johnson &
Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that disseminating a
harassment policy is "fundamental to meeting the requirement for exercising reasonable care
in preventing sexual harassment"); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283,
295 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that "[A]n antiharassment policy with complaint procedures is
an important consideration in determining whether [an] employer has satisfied"
Faragher/Ellerth); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811-12 (7th Cir. 1999); Brown v.
Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Not many courts, but a few, have gotten into the specifics of
employer policies, such as noting that if a policy requires employees
to report harassment, it should provide a way for that complaint to
be made to someone other than the harassing supervisor.275 But few
cases reject complaint policies for lacking multiple complaint
channels; some courts simply assume multiple channels are
implicitly available as a matter of "common sense, '276 and other
courts expressly note that the Faragher/Ellerth defense does not
actually require employers to adopt all of the elements courts have
noted as desirable for an employer policy.
277
In short, under both Kolstad and Faragher/Ellerth, far from
requiring employers to prove affirmative defenses focused on the
quality of their discrimination policies, courts could apply deference
to any policies that look facially adequate on paper. Courts rarely
require anything beyond adopting the basic policy-plus-complaints
formalities; as under Kolstad, courts typically reject employer
policies as insufficient under Faragher/Ellerth only when there is
specific evidence that the policy was facially inadequate278 or that
the employer violated or never truly implemented its own policy.
279
275. See, e.g., Walton, 347 F.3d at 1286; Leugers v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Servs.,
205 F.3d 1340, *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 3, 2000) (unpublished opinion); cf. Dowdy v. North Carolina,
No. 01-1706, 2001 WL 1408456, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 13, 2001).
276. Cooke v. Stefani Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 250 F.3d 564, 568-69 (7th Cir. 2001) (so holding
in evaluation of employer's Kolstad efforts) (citing Parkins v. Civil Constr. of Ill., 163 F.3d
1027, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998), which held an employer not liable for harassment where employee
failed to recomplain to a different individual after her first complaint yielded no useful
employer response. "A reasonable person, realizing that her complaints were ineffective,
would... seek a remedy elsewhere.").
277. See, e.g., Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that
although many courts express approval of guaranteed confidentiality and nonretaliation in
employer policies, these elements are not mandatory for a policy to suffice under
Faragher/Ellerth).
278. See supra notes 269-72 for cases in which employers failed to establish a Kolstad
defense; for a similar holding specific to the harassment context, see, for example, Morgan v.
Fellini's Pizza, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (rejecting antiharassment
policy that consisted of only a few sentences within a larger policy regarding employee
obligations, and failed to state the person(s) with whom complaints should be lodged, and
where management did not review any complaints made, explain the policy to new employees,
post the policy, or train supervisors in the policy).
279. See supra notes 269-72 for cases in which employers failed to establish a Kolstad
defense; for a similar holding specific to the harassment context, see, for example, Homesley
v. Freightliner Corp., 2003 WL 1908744, at *7 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2003) (rejecting a facially
plausible harassment policy where employer failed to respond genuinely to complaints:
"Homesley's complaint ... [was] not investigated at all. When Chitwood complained ... Lang
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Effectively, this means that once an employer meets a light burden
of establishing a facially plausible program, the court will assume
its efficacy, without evidence as to its substance, unless the
employee, in an unstated shifting of the burden of proof,2" proves a
reason the court should reject the employer policy.
2. The Need to Scrutinize the Specifics of Employer Policies for
Negativity- and Fear-Focused Policies, Which are Least Likely to
be Productive
In addition to research about happiness from primarily a hedonic
psychology perspective,28' another body of happiness research-
positive psychology 2 2-studies positive emotions,283 positive char-
acter traits,284 positive institutions, 2s and positive organizations. 2
8 6
A large psychological literature demonstrates that people's emo-
tional states, particularly positive affect, significantly affect their
said that Yarborough was 'just kidding, [and] he don't mean anything by it.' ... Lang's
approach violated one ... polic[y] which required that rumors of sexual harassment be
investigated.... This evidence suggests that Freightliner was not interested in preventing, let
alone correcting, sexual harassment.").
280. See Lawton, supra note 236, at 199 ("[Ihe courts' focus on paper policies and
procedures impermissibly shifts the burden of proof on prevention from the employer to the
employee.").
281. See, e.g., Frederick & Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, supra note 138.
282. See generally MARTIN SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: USING THE NEW POSITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY TO REALIZE YOUR POTENTIAL FOR LASTING FULFILLMENT (2002) (generally
describing positive psychology).
283. See, e.g., Shelly L. Gable & Jonathan Haidt, What (and Why) is Positive Psychology?,
9 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 103 (2005).
284. See, e.g., CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION 3-5
(Christopher Peterson & Martin E. P. Seligman eds., 2004).
285. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Institutions, Law, and
Policy, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 589 (Shane J. Lopez & C.R. Snyder eds., 2d
ed. 2009).
286. See, e.g., EXPLORINGPOSITIvERELATIONSHIPSAT WORK: BUILDINGATHEORETICALAND
RESEARCH FOUNDATION 3-5, 8-12 (Jane E. Dutton & Belle Rose Ragins eds., 2007); POSITIVE
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Debra Nelson & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2007); POSITIVE
ORGANIZATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP: FOUNDATIONS OF A NEW DISCIPLINE 3-6 (Kim S. Cameron et
al. eds., 2003).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:183
decision making, 87 problem solving,2 and behavior.289 In particular,
(1) people in positive emotional states are better at
problem solving than people in negative emotional
states;
29°
(2) emotional states, positive or negative, can be conta-
gious; 291 and
(3) diversity itself can improve group decision making. 29 2
The above findings imply that courts should examine employer
antidiscrimination programs with a critical eye toward their
content, not with the deference existing case law appears to grant
to just about any sort of "training." In particular, programs focused
on fear, for example, "don't do this or get sued," are undesirable
because fear is a form of negative affect not conducive to good
judgment and decision making.293 Social psychologist Susan Fiske
287. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Alice M. Isen, A Model of the Effect of Affect on
Economic Decision Making, 6 QUANTATIVE MARKETING & ECON. 17,17-18,35-36 (2008); Alice
M. Isen, An Influence of Positive Affect on Decision Making in Complex Situations: Theoretical
Issues in Practical Implications, 11 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 75, 75, 78-81 (2001); Alice M. Isen,
Positive Affect and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 417 (Michael Lewis &
Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000).
288. See, e.g., Alice M. Isen et al., The Influence of Positive Affect on Clinical Problem
Solving, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 221 (1991).
289. See, e.g., BARBARA FREDRICKSON, POSITIVITY: GROUNDBREAKING RESEARCH REVEALS
How TO EMBRACE THE HIDDEN STRENGTH OF POSITIVE EMOTIONS, OVERCOME NEGATIVITY AND
THRIVE (2009); Barbra L. Fredrickson, Positive Emotions and Upward Spirals in
Organizational Settings, in POSITIVE ORGANIZATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP 163 (Kim S. Cameron et
al. eds., 2003); Kareem J. Johnson & Barbra L. Fredrickson, "We All Look the Same to Me":
Positve Emotions Eliminate the Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 875
(2005).
290. Sigal G. Barsade & Donald E. Gibson, Why Does Affect Matter in Organizations?,
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2007, at 36, 45-46; Sonja Lyubomirsky et al., The Benefits of
Frequent Positive Affect: Does Happiness Lead to Success?, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 803, 803-04,
822-23 (2005); Barry M. Staw et al., Employee Positive Emotion and Favorable Outcomes at
the Workplace, 5 ORG. SCI. 51, 61 (1994). See generally FREDRICKSON, supra note 289.
291. James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, The Dynamic Spread of Happiness in a
Large Social Network- Longitudinal Analysis over 20 Years in the Framingham Heart Study,
338 BRIT. MED. J. 23, at 23, 30-31 (2009). See generally ELAINE HATFIED ET AL., EMOTIONAL
CONTAGION (1994).
292. See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: How THE POWER OF DIVERSITY
CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 131-74 (2007) (describing how
diversity with a group facilitates problem solving).
293. See DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR: WHY WE FEAR THE THINGS WE
SHOULDNT-AND PUT OURSELVES IN GREATER DANGER 6 (2008). But see ROBERT H. ROSEN,
JUST ENOUGH ANxIETY: THE HIDDEN DRIVER OF BUSINESS SUCCESS 1 (2008) (noting that the
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has researched how and why particular social contexts can discour-
age prejudice,294 finding that people naturally categorize others,
especially based upon such observable categories as age, gender,
and race.295 Fiske also found that people must be motivated to get
past such categorizations and learn about others.29 In experimental
laboratory settings, being a team member, or otherwise being
dependent upon others, motivates people to get past stereotyping.297
In other studies, Fiske showed that competition might lead people
to view competitors as individuals, because people are motivated to
learn how competitors will act.29' This body of research suggests
that training programs that involve collaboration or even competi-
tion among different kinds of people are likely to be successful types
of antidiscrimination/harassment training. So, for example, a
program could have people alternate between the roles of being
teachers and trainees.
Admittedly, this prescription is no panacea. Cooperative, positive
programs can be ineffective. Even if courts demand those features,
unsavory employers could add positive-sounding elements to
ineffectual or pretextual programs. All this Article suggests is that
courts' current treatment of these relevant factors-completely
ignoring them--certainly yields suboptimal decisions. Courts can
consider these factors without going too far by deeming them
necessary and sufficient elements of an antibias program. Courts
face a perhaps dauntingly subjective and holistic inquiry into the
quality of such programs, but that inquiry is one the Supreme Court
has demanded, so courts might as well consider, rather than ignore,
the critical subjective components of those programs.
opposite occasionally can be true).
294. Susan T. Fiske, What We Know Now About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem
of the Century, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 123 (2002). See generally SUSAN T.
FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: CORE MOTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 397-457 (2004).
295. Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998).
296. Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought and Social Motivation
Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 122-24 (2004).
297. Susan T. Fiske, Interdependence and the Reduction of Prejudice, in REDUCING
PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 115 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000).
298. Janet B. Ruscher & Susan T. Fiske, Interpersonal Competition Can Cause
Individuating Processes, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 832, 842 (1990).
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III. A BROADER ISSUE: How ECONOMICS STILL CAN PROVIDE
USEFUL ANALYSES IN A POST-BEHAVIORAL, POST-HAPPINESS
WORLD
This Article aims to provide useful diagnoses and prescriptions
for two significant issues in employment law (plaintiffs' damages
and employers' defenses), but more broadly, this employment law
analysis helps answer three broader questions about the usefulness
to law of economics and social science:
(1) Social science findings on human behavior, cognition,
and preferences add complexity to the older, simpler
"rational actor" economic model that generated easy
predictions and prescriptions; has this added com-
plexity made economics too indeterminate to be of
practical use?
(2) Compared to rational-actor models, newer social
science-based economics often prescribes paternalis-
tic regulations to improve or redress imperfect
decision making; when are such regulations- includ-
ing all deviations from free-market employment-at-
will-worth the transaction costs and incentive
distortions they create?
(3) That social science findings evolve and change is a
good thing, but it creates risks for courts relying on
recent findings that might become out of date; should
courts base decisions on recent social science at all?
A. Is Economics Now Too Indeterminate To Be of Practical Use?
This Article asserts that useful economic prescriptions for
improving law still are possible, contrary to those who criticize
behavioral economics and happiness research as too indeter-
minate,299 or who see little hope for prescriptions absent far more
299. See, e.g., Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Happiness and Public Policy: A Partial
Dissent (or, Why a Department of Homeland Happiness Would Be a Bad Idea), 22 J.L. & POL.
283, 284-85 (2006); Harry G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, Against Shareholder Participation:
A Treatment for McConvill's Psychonomicosis, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 41, 62-64
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data."'0 Yet while prescriptions are feasible, those prescriptions may
be narrower than those proposed in the past. Behavioral economics
and happiness research cannot find holy grail answers to galactic-
sized questions such as, "Is Title VII efficient?",0 1 but they can help
us find rules encouraging better "micro"-level decisions by "retail"
decision makers. For example, as this Article argues, judges should
be authorized to consider possible endowment values and happiness
impacts of unemployment in assessing "make-whole" damages and
to consider behavioral and happiness realities in assessing whether
a reasonable employee would report harassment internally. This
principle applies broadly outside employment. For example, we
cannot make all eminent domain compensation higher because
"society" features endowment effects-but we can ask judges, zoning
boards, or city councils making specific land decisions to consider
whether individual property owners have endowment values. In
sum, the new economics still can offer concrete, useful prescriptions
to improve law and judicial decisions-but these prescriptions are
likely "micro"-level suggestions usable by "retail"-level decision
makers, not "macro"-level recommendations for broad social policy.
More broadly, the import and impact of behavioral economics and
happiness research fit into a more general historical pattern of what
happens to scientific discoveries. Having been applied to almost all
legal fields, economic analysis of law is following a pattern common
within the history of science: (1) early proponents of new ideas
enthusiastically claiming overly broad revolutionary potential,
followed by (2) a second generation of proponents of those ideas
providing more balanced, careful, and nuanced analysis, followed by
(3) a third generation of proponents of those ideas finally being able
to synthesize and incorporate those ideas within a more general
conceptual setting.0 2 Recent behavioral and happiness scholarship
(2007); Will Wilkinson, In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It Imply
for Policy?, 590 POLY ANALYSIS 1, 1, 5-17 (2007).
300. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Difficult Path from Observation to Prescription, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 39-40 (2002); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics,
and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-60 (1998); Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and
Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 470, 492, 509-11 (2007).
301. See supra note 7 (citing such scholarship).
302. Seegenerally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52-53 (3d
ed. 1996).
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probably qualifies as first-generation, but this paper offers a mix of
second-generation nuanced analysis and (hopefully, but time will
tell) third-generation synthesis and refinement.
B. When Are Paternalistic Regulations Worth the Transaction
Costs and Incentive Distortions?
When does regulating market transactions like those of employers
and employees help enough to be worth the (a) transaction costs and
(b) distortion of incentives? One partial but important answer is
that different balances are proper in different markets. As to (a),
imposing transaction costs to improve decisions may not be worth
it for low-stakes, frequently repeated consumer decisions (for
example, rebates) but may be for major, less-repeated decisions like
job searches and home purchases. This Article thus differs from
those who see behavioral economics as justifying broader tort
liability for run-of-the-mill consumer transactions.
As to (b), incentive distortion, one counterargument to regulations
(or legal liability) is, "we should be more libertarian to minimize
preference distortion," such as by having flat taxes rather than the
current progressive and exception-riddled tax system. Yet concern
for distorting preferences assumes preferences not only exist
already, but are stable and worthy of not being distorted. Much of
behavioral economics and happiness research calls into question
whether preferences exist or are instead socially constructed. °3 If
preferences are constructed by marketing and other influences, they
may not deserve as much deference as economics traditionally
assumes; 3 4 to the extent that the status quo is not neutral, it is not
necessarily paternalist for the law to guide people in desirable
directions.3 °5 Further, incentive distortion is inevitable in employ-
ment markets, given how pervasively regulated those markets are.
Paternalism is thus less objectionable as preference-distorting in
303. See generally THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic
eds., 2006).
304. See generally PETER A. UBEL, FREE MARKET MADNESS: WHY HUMAN NATURE IS AT
ODDS WITH ECONOMICS-AND WHY IT MATrERS (2009).
305. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, & HAPPINESS 5 (2008); Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Peter H. Huang,
Positive Parentalism, NATL L.J., Jan. 26, 2008.
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employment than in most other markets; unless we go back to
unregulated nineteenth century labor markets, employment mar-
kets inevitably are distorted by law and policy.
C. Should Courts Base Decisions on Recent Social Science at All?
Governed by precedent, courts are slow to adopt economics and
social science findings. This is not always a bad thing; as Justice
White once wrote in a securities fraud case, "with no staff econo-
mists, no experts schooled in the 'efficient-capital-market hypothe-
sis,' no ability to test the validity of empirical market studies,
[judges] are not well equipped to embrace novel constructions of a
statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory."3" The recent
history of the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) men-
tioned in that quote may be a cautionary tale. "Of all recent
developments in financial economics, the efficient capital market
hypothesis ('ECMH') has achieved the widest acceptance by the
legal culture.... [T]he ECMH is now the context in which serious
discussion of the regulation of financial markets takes place,"3"7 two
law professors wrote six years after the (in)famous pronouncement
by financial economist Michael Jensen that "there is no other
proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence
supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis."08 Yet just six
years ago, another leading corporate and securities professor
summed up a newer, contrary central tenet of behavioral finance:
"recently, however, the idea of market efficiency has fallen into
disrepute as a result of market events and growing empirical
evidence of inefficiencies."3 9
Yet employment discrimination law features several areas in
which exploiting even less-than-certain social science findings beats
the alternative. In employment discrimination law, courts must un-
dertake discretionary decisions such as damages awards requiring
306. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
307. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1984).
308. Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN.
ECON. 95, 95 (1978).
309. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 635 (2003).
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assessing the impact of job loss, holistic evaluations of employers'
antibias programs, and assessment of whether it was "reasonable"
for a harassment victim not to complain internally. Admittedly,
relying on social science findings creates a risk of relying on soon-to-
be-disproven assumptions, but there is no alternative of relying on
solely objective facts for these sorts of unavoidably subjective,
discretionary decisions. Courts hamper their efforts by excluding
considerations with solid empirical support, like the behavioral
economics and happiness research findings this Article discusses.
CONCLUSION
This Article has two aims. First, it applies behavioral economics
and happiness research findings to provide reforms of a field of
law-employment discrimination and all employment law based on
discrimination law. Specifically:
• Employment damages should consider whether the
plaintiff possessed an endowment value in the lost job,
which typically will occur in cases of unlawful termina-
tion, rather than cases of unlawful failures to hire.
• Courts should not be so quick to assume, and dismiss
cases by holding, that all harassed employees must
complain on the job; courts should recognize that com-
plaints cannot be expected from employees who feel
endowments in their jobs, who perceive a particular
vulnerability to retaliation, or who suffer learned helpless-
ness due to the harassment.
" Rather than assume virtually any employer antidis-
crimination program sufficient, courts should scrutinize
programs more critically based on research findings about
the greater effectiveness of learning and problem solving
in positive rather than negative emotional states.
This Article's second aim is broader and more methodological.
It illustrates how, and to what extent, economic analyses incorpo-
rating behavioral and happiness research findings still can offer in-
sightful analyses and prescriptions. Social science-infused econom-
ics may well incorporate too many considerations-nonmonetary
utilities and motivations, endowment value, cognitive imperfections,
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and so on-to allow the sort of definitive conclusions on broad social
issues (like whether a given market should be regulated at all) that
once were common fare within economic analysis of law. Yet even
with multiple cognitive, psychological, and emotional realities
added, economics still can offer helpful advice in the individualized
determinations that are the bread and butter of law in action:
" damages determinations of the harm an individual
suffered from a job loss or a property taking;
" evaluations of when it is reasonable to expect an employee
to complain on the job about harassment; and
" inquiries into the effectiveness of antidiscrimination
programs, or more broadly of other compliance programs
laws require of corporations.
That courts have not yet incorporated such considerations into
their analyses is disappointing but unsurprising. Judges make
decisions that are based on precedent and that create precedent,
so they are appropriately cautious and slow to start basing their
decisions on recent social science. Further, judges are not social
scientists. They cannot be expected to know recent research
findings until publications (such as, hopefully, this Article) call
those findings to their attention and outline their relevance to
the damages, reasonableness, and other determinations the law
commonly requires courts and other governmental decision-making
bodies to make in various fields of law.
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